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A longstanding trend in development studies literature has emerged that 
emphasizes the importance of addressing issues of power in all facets of development, 
including in the planning and design of development interventions. While top-down 
planning reinforces the view of the poor as impotent, powerless actors whose well-being 
is dependent upon the actions of others through concentration of decision-making power 
in the hands of those who take on the role of trustees, popular participation in planning 
empowers the poor by viewing the poor as competent, rational actors who are better 
suited to improve their own lives than any external expert.  
This research report analyzes the power dynamics involved in an attempt by an 
Australian mining company (Mineral Commodities Ltd) and the South African 
government to implement a mining project in the Xolobeni area of the Wild Coast of 
South Africa. The issue of popular participation has always been a large part of the 
debate of whether to approve the mining license.  Opponents of the project claim that the 
process discouraged and even prevented local participation, while supporters claim 
variously that either sufficient local participation did take place or that local 
participation was unimportant because the project would improve the lives of local 
residents regardless of how much participation took place.  This report aims to analyze 
the power dynamics that came into play throughout the long fight over the proposed mine 
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Chapter One: Introduction, Research Questions and Methodology 
 
1.1 Introduction  
The story of international development, like other processes that involve a 
combination of economic, social, and physical elements, is a story of power.  Throughout 
history, differences in wealth both between people and between nations, whether it is 
measured via food, land, assets, or money, have always been affected and largely 
determined by power-relations.  Power and wealth go hand in hand, as those able to gain 
control over resources exert power over others seeking their share for survival or material 
gain.  Any standard of wealth is truly just a measure of the resources one has under 
his/her control.  Therefore, those with the power to take control over the world’s 
resources are able to amass wealth, and gain more power by controlling and limiting 
other people’s access to resources.    
 Cooperative development, or the idea that the development and economic 
progression of one nation is beneficial to all nations (provided that they are not enemies), 
is a concept that was popularized after World War II via the Marshall Plan and the 
creation of the numerous international financial institutions charged with assisting 
worldwide economic development.  The idea that worldwide prosperity is both good and 
possible received further credence upon the fall of the Soviet Union and most other 
communist systems in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Francis Fukuyama argued in his 
famous article “The End of History?”, that “the endpoint of mankind’s ideological 
evolution” had been reached, and that now with all that silly ideology out of the way, we 
could all get down to the business of applying our tried and true system of liberal 
democracy throughout the world, a modernizing process that would surely end in wealth 
and prosperity for all (1989).  
Unfortunately, despite general acceptance of the capitalist economic system, 
enormous levels of poverty persist throughout much of the world.  The concept of 
cooperative development, combined with the system of world capitalism, has generated 
many colossal contradictions.  Wealth inequality has deepened, both within and between 
nations, due to the workings of a capitalist system that benefits the rich and powerful, 
allowing them to continually increase their wealth, often at the expense of the poor.   
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One reason for the persistence of poverty and inequality in today’s world is the 
lack of development interventions that directly address the issue of power, especially in 
terms of the way the interventions themselves are designed and implemented.  In most 
cases, development projects are planned and designed by technocrats and experts such as 
government bureaucrats, private companies seeking to maximize profit, development 
professionals, and bank officials.  Involvement of the intended beneficiaries, the very 
people that a given development intervention aims to affect in ways that can be 
fundamentally life-altering, is often only done once a plan has already been formulated.  
Such top-down planning reinforces the powerlessness of the poor
1
, and instead attempts 
to help them through paternalistic guiding action.   
A longstanding trend in development studies literature has emerged that 
emphasizes the importance of addressing issues of power in all facets of development, 
including in the planning and design of development interventions.  The idea that poor 
people can be empowered through the process of planning and otherwise participating in 
development interventions is a concept that has gained significant traction in 
development circles.  While top-down planning reinforces the view of the poor as 
impotent, powerless actors whose well-being is dependent upon the actions of others by 
concentrating decision-making power in the hands of those who take on the role of 
trustees, popular participation in planning empowers the poor by viewing the poor as 
competent, rational actors who are better suited to improve their own lives than any 
external expert.  Popular participation in development planning has thus been advocated 
as a way of combating normalized power-relations.   
The locus of power and influence was a fundamental issue in the case study which 
forms the basis of this dissertation. The Xolobeni Mineral Sands Project is located on a 
22 KM stretch of coastline in the Xolobeni area of the Wild Coast of South Africa, about 
30 KM south of Port Edward between the Mzamba River in the north and the Mtentu 
River in the south. The area is located in the former Transkei homeland, now part of the 
larger Eastern Cape Province.  The Xolobeni area is more commonly called coastal 
                                                 
1
 The term ‘poor’ is used here, as well as numerous times later in this thesis, to mean specifically a lack of 
monetary resources and other capital assets that can be easily converted into capital.  Many local people 
from the Xolobeni area have asserted, both publicly and through my own personal research and interviews, 
that they are not ‘poor’ as they have enough to eat and are able to sustain themselves through farming. 
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AmaDiba, but has been referred to as Xolobeni in most news stories and other 
documentation regarding the mining project.  An Australian mining company, Mineral 
Commodities Ltd (MRC), obtained the prospecting rights to the area in 1998.  In 2002, 
the company claimed to have discovered 9 million tonnes of ilmenite, a mineral used in 
titanium production, making it the tenth largest mineral sands resource in the world.
2
  The 
company spoke of plans to build a smelter nearby to process the minerals in the city of 
East London, but details never materialized.   
In March 2007, Transworld Energy and Minerals Resources (TEM), MRC’s 75 
percent owned South African subsidiary, submitted a mining right application for the 
Xolobeni project.  In the license application, MRC/TEM has claimed that the mine will 
create at least 557 permanent jobs (permanent meaning for the duration of the mine, 
which is predicted to be 22 years) and several other opportunities for temporary 
employment.  In July 2008, the Department of Minerals and Energy issued the company a 
license to begin mining in 30 percent of the project area, while the remaining 70 percent 
remains open for prospecting and possible mining in the future.   
The mining right was suspended due an appeal lodged in 2008 by the Amadiba 
Crisis Committee (ACC) which was formed by community activists to oppose the mining 
project.  The main argument of the appeal is that the community was not properly 
consulted in the licensing process, and has not consented to the mining of their land.  The 
most striking piece of evidence in the appeal is the existence of numerous forged consent 
documents supposedly collected by the mining company in support of the mining 
development, many of which are signed by community members who have long since 
deceased.
3
  In June 2011, the Department of Mineral Affairs revoked the mining license 
based on the ACC’s appeal, but left open the possibility of re-issuing the license in asking 
the mining company to provide further information within three months.
4
  
 The issue of popular participation has always been a large part of the debate of 
whether to approve the mining license.  Opponents of the project claim that the process 
                                                 
2
 Mineral Commodities Limited Annual Report, December 2007 
3
 Amabida Crisis Committee’s Internal Appeal to the Minister of Minerals and Energy Against the Award 
of a Mining Right to Transworld Energy and Mineral Resources (SA) (PTY) LTD, September 2008  
4
 The decision to revoke the license was made after my fieldwork (done February-April 2011) was 
completed, meaning that my interviews and other research was conducted when the appeal was still 
pending, the license suspended but not revoked.   
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discouraged and even prevented local participation, while supporters claim variously that 
either sufficient local participation did take place, or that local participation was 
unimportant because the project would improve the lives of local residents regardless.  
This report aims to analyze the power dynamics that came into play throughout the long 
fight over the proposed mine, and draw out whatever lessons can be learned regarding 
South Africa’s development process.   
 
1.2 Research Questions 
 This research report analyzes the power dynamics involved in an attempt by an 
Australian mining company (Mineral Commodities Ltd) and the South African 
government to implement a mining project in the Xolobeni area of the Wild Coast of 
South Africa.  The main research question that is posed is:  
-What are the power dynamics involved in the proposed mining project in Xolobeni?  
The subsidiary research questions are as follows: 
-How have the mining company and the government attempted to implement the mining 
project?  How can we interpret the balance struck between minimal and substantive 
involvement of those who would be most directly affected?  
- In what ways have factions of those living on and near the site of the proposed mine 
developed their own mechanisms for influencing the process?  What strategies have the 
Xolobeni people used to employ their collective agency in their opposition to the mine?  
 The research questions take as a given that there was a real attempt by the South 
African government, the Australian mining company, and certain local elites to 
implement the mining project, and that the project was resisted by the vast majority of the 
local residents.  I will provide evidence for these assumptions in the introduction of this 
chapter (Chapter 1), as well as in Chapters 3 and 4.  
 In order to answer the research questions listed above, it is useful to briefly 
examine the major developmental interventions imposed on Xolobeni in the past.  During 
my field research, a recurring theme in the community interviews was a link in the 
respondents’ minds between the attempted implementation of the mining project and the 
attempted implementation of past development plans.  In order to gain a better 
understanding of the community’s strategies of resistance to the mining project that is the 
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main focus of this study, it is useful to conduct a brief review of these historical 
development interventions.  
Three historical development interventions were mentioned repeatedly: the 
Betterment Scheme during apartheid culminating in the Mpondo revolt in 1960, a plan to 
grow gum trees for Sappi which ended in the “Gum Tree Rebellion” in 1999, and a 
community-based eco-tourism project initiated by the EU Development Programme in 
the 1999 that resulted in the company AmaDiba Adventures.  An examination of these 
past development interventions will provide us with a perspective of how the South 
African government’s strategy of development implementation has changed over time, as 
well as how the Xolobeni people’s strategies of resistance have changed and evolved.  
One final subsidiary research question must therefore be added: 
-How do the historical development interventions implemented in the area affect and 
inform both the attempt by the mining company and the government to implement the 
current mining project, as well as the community’s strategies of resistance?  
 
1.3 Structure of Dissertation 
The structure of this study will be as follows:  
Chapter One begins with an introduction of the main ideas that will be explored in the 
thesis (see above).  The main argument that I will be using in the thesis reflects a trend in 
development studies that emphasizes the necessity of popular participation in 
development interventions; participation which enables influence and power amongst 
those affected by development projects minimizes the possibility that they will be 
marginalized, and maximizes the possibility that they will be empowered.  Following this 
introduction, the main and subsidiary research questions are clearly stated and discussed. 
Subsequently, I will provide a brief outline of the structure of the thesis. Finally, the 
research methodology used in this dissertation will be discussed and justified. 
Chapter Two focuses on the idea of participation in development interventions.  
Technocrats, politicians, investors and other initiators of development processes have to 
address a basic tension in the way they involve those who will be affected by the project. 
On one hand they may pursue a route of minimal participation where those affected are 
consulted but not necessarily given any influence over key decisions, for example 
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whether a project goes ahead.  A minimalist approach to participation is attractive to 
those who wish to retain primary influence in a situation either for their own self interest 
or because they believe that the greater good might trump the specific interests of those 
who stand to be affected.  On the other hand, authorities may choose a format of 
substantial involvement where those who will be directly affected have considerable or 
absolute influence over key decisions taken.  This would reduce the possibility of 
marginal groups being strong-armed by powerful interests.  The balance between 
minimal and substantial power is shaped both by the power of different interest groups 
and by the principles, frameworks and objectives of the authorities.  Yet the kind of 
influence exerted by those affected by a development process is not necessarily limited to 
the official, ‘invited’ forums of participation established by authorities.  Grassroots 
activists may choose to create their own, ‘invented’ spaces of participation, for example 
through protest, through which they attempt to influence the outcome.   
Chapter Three begins with a brief description of the major historical development 
interventions in the affected area. First, the apartheid government’s Betterment Scheme is 
discussed as well as the ensuing 1960 Mpondo revolt.  Subsequently, the gum tree 
development, culminating in the 1999 “Gum Tree Rebellion” is summarized, followed by 
the tourism development initiated in 1999 by the EU Development Programme.  The way 
in which the South African government has attempted to implement the mining project is 
then discussed, and a conclusion is drawn from the sequence that the South African 
government continues to employ a top-down development strategy that facilitates a 
situation in which significant participation in development is highly unlikely.  In addition, 
the responses of the local population to each top-down development intervention reveals 
that the people of Xolobeni have continually fought for the ability to meaningfully 
participate in its own development.  Finally, evidence from numerous scholars studying 
the actions of the post-apartheid South African government and the structure of the 
economy is cited in support of the argument that the development strategy of the South 
African government is inherently neo-liberal and influenced by a particularly strong 
mining sector.  The chapter concludes by arguing that the current political economy in 
the South African development field creates a situation in which high levels of 
participation are often discouraged in deference to more powerful interests (those with 
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capital).  However, subjects of development may often use their collective agency and the 
wide array of rights granted to them by the new Constitutions to force popular 
participation in decision-making and implementation.   
Chapter Four centers on the different strategies used by the people of Xolobeni to resist 
the mining project by employing their collective agency.  The strategies outlined in the 
chapter include; various forms of popular protest both violent and non-violent, appeals to 
the traditional tribal authority to stop the mine on the community’s
5
 behalf, the formation 
of the AmaDiba Crisis Committee (ACC) as a semi-permanent body of community 
activists to combat the mining project, the use of the Legal Resource Center (LRC) to 
lodge legal appeals, the creation of a community-based development project 
(Simbhademe) as a job-creating alternative to the mining development, and active 
participation in the selection of local ward councilors in the May 2011 elections to ensure 
that all representatives are anti-mining in an effort to change the behaviour of the local 
municipal government.  The chapter concludes by arguing that the people of Xolobeni, in 
their post-apartheid context, have discovered numerous strategies to resist top-down 
development interventions and fight for real participation beyond the simple non-
compliance and violent protest of the past.  The wide array of effective strategies at their 
disposal has seemed to empower the community, and fostered its self-mobilization.   
Chapter Five provides a conclusion based on all the issues covered; the positives and 
negatives of varying levels of popular participation in development projects, the repeated 
top-down development interventions in the Xolobeni area, the South African 
government’s neo-liberal development orientation, and the Xolobeni people’s innovative 
strategies to oppose the mine.  The chapter argues that employing a high level of 
participation in development projects can help avoid the harmful effects often associated 
with big, top-down development interventions, even in the field of mining where the idea 
of participation seems impractical.   
   
                                                 
5
 The term community is used here, as well as numerous times later in this thesis, with the understanding 
that the use of the term community does not imply a homogeneous group of people sharing a common 
identity, common desires, or common goals: “representations of ‘community’ interests all too easily muffle 
dissent and inequalities within communities” (Cornwall 2002: 53).  Therefore, the term community is used 
here to simply mean people who reside in a given area, in this case the coastal region between the Mzamba 




 The research strategy I have selected for this thesis is that of a case study, defined 
here as a detailed examination of a single example of a class of phenomena (Abercrombie 
et al 1984: 34).  The use of case studies has attracted a large amount of criticism over the 
years, as detractors of the technique have claimed that case studies cannot be generalized 
as it is impossible to generalize from one single case.  The supposed lack of ability to 
generalize from a case study is viewed as particularly negative due to the tendency to 
value general, theoretical, context-independent knowledge over concrete, practical, 
context-dependent knowledge (Flyvjberg 2006: 221).    
Flyvjberg (2006) has produced a convincing rebuttal of this prevalent anti-case 
study argument which I will briefly review in order to defend the worthiness of my own 
case study: 
First, the case study produces the type of context-dependent knowledge that research on 
learning shows to be necessary to allow people to develop from rule-based beginners to 
virtuoso experts. (Flyvjberg 2006: 221) 
 
Here, Flyvjberg is essentially defending the importance of practical, context-dependent 
knowledge.  Learning general theory is an important part of the learning process, but it 
usually comes at the beginning.  As a learner seeks to become an expert on an issue, s/he 
closely examines numerous specific, concrete cases in order to observe how general 
theories work in practice.  Only after one has an “intimate knowledge of several thousand 
concrete cases in their area” are they considered to be an expert (Flyvjberg 2006: 222).  
Thus, case studies are extremely useful in becoming an expert in a particular discipline.   
 More generally, quantitative research and case study research are not in 
competition with each other in an either/or, right/wrong battle.  Both methods have value 
and both have limits, while doing entirely different jobs.  A major advantage of case 
study research is that it lends itself to an open ended investigative style where the 
researcher can flexibly follow up on new information obtained throughout the research 
process.  It cannot really speak to the extent to which a phenomena or position exists, but 
it can fully examine a particular phenomenon or position on its own terms.   
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 A second main defence of case studies once again addresses the criticism that 
they are not useful in producing generalized theory.  The fact is that social science does 
not produce truly predictive theory (Flyvbjerg 2006: 223).  Instead, all knowledge 
produced in the social sciences is by its very nature context-dependent.  This reality is 
reflected by the repeated criticism of large development organizations such as the World 
Bank and United States Agency for International Development by development experts 
for their continuous search for one size fits all solutions to development problems.  The 
recent trend emphasizing local knowledge and the importance of the participation of local 
populations in development projects indicates that focusing on general, context-
independent theory is failing to produce improvements on the ground.  Flyvbjerg goes on 
to argue that it is in fact possible to generalise based on a single case if that case is well 
selected:  
One can often generalize on the basis of a single case, and the case study may be central 
to scientific development via generalization as supplement or alternative to other 
methods. But formal generalization is overvalued as a source of scientific development, 
whereas “the force of example” is underestimated. (Italics in original) (Flyvjberg 2006: 
228) 
 
By probing the case of the Xolobeni Mineral Sands Project, I am hopeful that I have 
provided both myself and the reader with a concrete, practical, and context-dependent 
example of the political economy of development in post-apartheid South Africa.  Rather 
than testing a general hypothesis, my analysis is specific to only the Xolobeni case.  
However, through my examination, valuable lessons can be learned about the nature of 
development on a broad scale; the value of properly understanding one case is that it can 
be compared with other properly understood cases and thus contribute to collective 
understanding. 
 The main evidence I will be using in this thesis is qualitative in nature.  I have 
conducted interviews with 32 stakeholders, usually individually but sometimes in small 
groups of 2 or 3, all of which were qualitative interviews.  Qualitative data has been 
criticized by some academics as ‘soft’ data vulnerable to differing interpretations and 
particularly susceptible to researcher bias.  However, the idea of a completely unbiased 
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and neutral researcher has long since been discredited.  Instead, the idea of researcher 
reflexivity is used as a way to account for bias: 
…in qualitative (and maybe also in quantitative) inquiry, the question is neither whether 
the researcher affects the process nor whether such an effect can be prevented. This 
methodological point has been turned into a commitment of reflexivity. The illusion of 
denying the human touch is countered by establishing an agenda for assessment on 
subjectivity…during all steps of the research process, the effect of the researcher should 
be assessed, and, later on, shared…Bias, in the sense of undesirable or hidden skewness, 
is thus accounted for, though not eliminated. (Malterud 2001: 484)  
 
 In the interest of researcher reflexivity, I would like to divulge that I am 
sympathetic to a radical, somewhat neo-marxist approach to development.  I generally 
believe that power should be shifted downward to those who are currently disempowered, 
and that the state is the best agent to facilitate this power-shift, because left unchecked 
capitalism naturally shifts power upward into fewer and fewer hands as wealth is 
consolidated and inequality deepens.  Furthermore, I believe that the world capitalist 
system inherently favours large corporations where wealth is concentrated (such as 
mining companies).  Undoubtedly, my personal orientation is related to the analysis I 
ended up making because it influenced the kind of reading I did, the kinds of questions I 
asked and the type of structural issues to which I am sensitive.  In acknowledging this my 
aim is, nevertheless, to substantiate as fully as possible the claims I am making. 
 In terms of the research process used, I have used an approach of inductive 
reasoning whereby I have examined the data with as clear of a theoretical slate as 
possible and attempted to derive theory from the evidence.
6
  Before doing field research 
and personal interviews, I believed that the most striking narrative would be that of a 
community attempting to defend their traditional livelihood systems, livelihood systems 
that would be threatened and possibly destroyed by the mining project.  While this is still 
a major part of the story, I believe the most dominant narrative is that of a community 
repeatedly fighting for control over their own development, perhaps partially as a way of 
protecting their livelihood systems.  This led me to a review of the literature on 
participation in development (see Chapter 2), and to my concluding theory that the 
                                                 
6
 A completely clear theoretical slate is obviously impossible, thus I have included my worldview in the 
interest of researcher reflexivity.  
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current political economy in post-apartheid South Africa does not facilitate or encourage 
participation but rather severely limits it.  
 The strategy for data collection must also be discussed specifically.  In order to 
answer my main research question (what are the power dynamics involved in the 
proposed mining project in Xolobeni?), it was necessary to interview key stakeholders.  
The main stakeholders identified were the Xolobeni community, the AmaDiba Crisis 
Committee (ACC), Xolco, the traditional tribal authority presiding over Xolobeni, the 
mining company MRC/TEM, the local Mbizana municipal government, and the national 
government as represented by the Department of Mineral Affairs and the Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism.  As research progressed, it became evident that the 
Accoda Trust, a community organization meant to attract and manage tourism 
development, was also a key stakeholder as most of the community viewed Xolco as a 
forced replacement of the Accoda Trust.  
 In terms of the broad Xolobeni community, the goal of data collection was to 
attempt to verify the numerous newspaper articles and previous reports that indicate that 
the local people were against the mining project, while at the same time attempting to 
gain a deeper understanding of why people are against the mine.  Random houses along 
the coast were thus approached, in the company of a community guide and translator, and 
in depth interviews were conducted amongst the willing.  The number of interviews 
necessary was determined using Kvale’s law of diminishing returns; “new interviews are 
conducted to a point where further interviews yield little new knowledge” (Kvale 1994: 
165).  Community members actively involved in either the ACC or Xolco were then 
sought specifically after interviews with each organization’s public relations chair, who 
provided names and contact information.  The community guide helped seek out former 
Accoda Trust members, local representatives (headmen) of the tribal authority, and locals 
who are known to support the mine.  Thus, random sampling was never conducted in any 
stage, but rather purposive sampling aimed at locating those with the most knowledge of 
and involvement with the mining project and its opposition or support in the community.  
No attempt was made to quantify responses or categories of responses, as the sample was 
non-representative and questions were not asked in a standardized way to all participants 
(Malterud 2001: 487).  Interviews were normally conducted individually in order to 
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eliminate the effects of group-think, but on a few occasions interviews were conducted in 
small groups of never more than three at the request of the interviewees due to their 
personal time constraints.   
The result is 26 community respondents, two of whom are on the board of the 
ACC, two of whom are on the board of Xolco and one who was formerly on the board, 
three headmen from the tribal authority, and four of whom were involved with Accoda 
Trust. All attempts to contact anyone from MRC/TEM went unanswered, and interviews 
with the DMA and DEAT could not be obtained.  Numerous interviews with officials at 
the Mbizana municipality were conducted.  A decision was made, once the community 
interviews were completed and the narrative of participation had been revealed, to 
specifically seek interviews with the three Ward Councillors currently representing the 
Xolobeni community (before the May election), as well as their three likely replacements, 
as Ward Councillors are meant to facilitate and encourage people’s participation in 
government (see Chapters 2, 3, and 4).  Two of the three before-election Councillors 
were interviewed, as well as all three likely replacements (all three of whom are now 
Ward Councillors).  Mbizana’s Local Economic Development officer for Xolobeni was 
also interviewed, along with a fieldworker for the Xolobeni area.  Finally, interviews 
were conducted with Colin Bell, the former CEO of Wilderness Safaris, an eco-tourism 
company that was on the verge of a deal with Accoda Trust, as well as John Clarke, a 














Chapter 2: Participation and Empowerment in Development Interventions 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 The contemporary concept of development has existed for over 65 years, since the 
creation of the Bretton-Woods institutions following the end of World War II.  While 
some development goals have been met, it is not controversial to state that development 
has largely failed to successfully assist the underdeveloped world in its bid to ‘catch-up’ 
with the wealthy industrialized nations.  Poverty remains unacceptably high, as an 
astonishing 40 percent of the developing world’s population still lives in absolute 
poverty, while inequality, both between and within nations, has actually grown 
(Bourguignon and Morrison 2002).  
 Amidst the frustratingly slow pace of change, the only reasonable thing to do is to 
re-examine the very way that development interventions are designed, structured, 
implemented, and monitored.  One of the positions that have emerged from the critique of 
development interventions is that the top-down nature of development interventions 
intensify the causes of poverty and underdevelopment, reinforcing the very power 
relations that they should be attempting to reverse.  Thus, development planning often 
“perpetuates elitist, centralizing, and change resistant tendencies” (Grabow and Heskin 
1973: 106).  Time and time again, development practitioners who design and implement 
development interventions have a distorted view of local realities, leading to projects that 
do not address the real problem.  In response to the deficiencies of top-down 
development, a huge movement has arisen in development thinking and practice towards 
bottom-up development strategies and methods that attempt to confront and resolve the 
problems and contradictions that tend to arise from a top-down style.   
 The most obvious starting point in confronting top-down development is to 
envision a bottom-up form of development and examine its benefits and limitations.  
Participation in development therefore becomes eminent, not only in the implementation 
of development projects but also in the design, planning, and monitoring stages.  The 
concept of popular participation recognizes people’s right to control their own 
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development, empowers them to change their lives proactively, and leads to more 
successful development outcomes.  
This chapter discusses the reasons that top-down style development has repeatedly 
failed to reach its goals; a distorted view of local realities, bias against local knowledge, 
and lack of ownership from the intended beneficiaries.  The idea of participation is then 
discussed in detail: how and in what way people can participate in development projects, 
and what level of popular participation should be strived for by development institutions 
and governments.  Evidence that participation leads to better development outcomes is 
then provided, along with an explanation as to why this is the case.  The argument that 
participation is an end in itself in the interest of empowerment is presented.  Next, it is 
argued that participation is an idea that is widely embraced in theory, but often resisted in 
practice.  The reasons for this phenomenon are addressed, as well as possible strategies to 
encourage increased participation in reality rather than just on paper.  The chapter 
concludes by contrasting ‘invited’ and ‘invented’ spaces of popular participation in 
development.  
 
2.2 Biases Inherent in Top-Down Development 
 Numerous physical, mental, and societal factors can distort development 
practitioners’ view of the problems facing the poor, especially in rural areas.  In Rural 
Development: Putting the Last First (1983), Robert Chambers labels the development 
professionals in charge of researching, designing, implementing and monitoring rural 
development projects “rural development tourists” as they normally live in urban areas, if 
they reside in the country at all.  Even if said professionals happened to grow up in a rural 
area, they have doubtlessly since moved to the city.  The very same process of the core 
extracting surplus from the periphery that makes so many rural areas isolated and 
underdeveloped in the first place is what caused them to do so: 
Rural parents educate their children hoping they will gain urban employment; officials in 
districts seek postings to regional headquarters, those in regional headquarters try to get to 
capital cities, and those in capital cities try to join the brain drain to richer countries. 
(Chambers 1983: 169) 
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 With almost all development professionals living outside rural areas, a quick 
picture of the rural situation needs to be made in order to develop a suitable development 
plan.  Unfortunately, the amount of time needed to get an accurate picture of the rural 
reality is rarely taken.  Instead, “rural development tourism” is conducted, and with it 
comes numerous biases that affect what is seen, who is met, and what is discussed, 
distorting the outsiders’ view of the situation.   
 Spatial biases occur due to simple geographic realities.  Rural areas closer to 
regional headquarters are visited more often than those more isolated (Chambers 1983: 
13).  Perhaps more importantly, people, places, and things closer to a decent road are 
given priority over those that are far from serviceable infrastructure (Ibid).  Rather than 
having random and unpredictable effects on who and what is seen, this spatial bias 
explicitly favours the rich over the poor, as the poorest people in rural settings are often 
the most isolated and the furthest from infrastructure (Ibid).  Thus, spatial biases 
exacerbate the most important and fluid form of bias, person biases. 
 Person biases refer to the type of people that are encountered on a typical short-
term visit to a rural area.  Elite bias leads the researcher to wealthier and more influential 
members of a community; headmen, religious leaders, teachers, and paraprofessionals 
(Chambers 1983: 18).  Gender bias causes male input to be much higher than female, as 
females are often culturally pressured to be deferential and timid, especially when faced 
with male visitors (Ibid: 19).  Community members who have adopted new services, 
tools, or practices are given more attention than those who have not due to a user/adopter 
bias (Ibid).  Those who are “active, present, and living” are also given a greater degree of 
attention due to ease of access and visibility (Ibid).  Thus, person biases lead the outsider, 
researcher, or development professional to those who are relatively wealthy, have high-
status, are male, and are active and participating; in essence, to those who are relatively 
empowered in their setting.  Those who are disempowered; the poor, the isolated, 
outcasts, women, and those less active and slower to adopt new services, programmes, or 
technologies, are given less attention due to these natural occurring person biases.   
 The biggest and most important bias affecting top-down development procedures 
is the bias against local knowledge: 
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From rich-country professionals and urban-based professionals in third world countries 
right down to the lowliest extension workers it is a common assumption that the modern 
scientific knowledge of the centre is sophisticated, advanced and valid and, conversely, 
that whatever rural people may know will be unsystematic, imprecise, superficial and 
often plain wrong. (Chambers 1983: 76) 
However, local knowledge that is worthy and valuable does exist in large quantities, even 
in places where the vast majority of the population is uneducated and illiterate.  
Knowledge of the structure of the community, the geography of the land, the nature of 
the local climate, the power relations in the community, viable livelihood systems in the 
local context, and what problems stand in the way of the community’s development are 
all areas of knowledge that someone who has lived in the community for all or most of 
their lives is in a much better position to possess.  In terms of farming, which areas of 
land are most fertile and what crops work best where is something that a local farmer 
may be more qualified to answer in his or her own local setting than a scientist studying 
agriculture in a lab.  In terms of improving farming output, the local farmers’ knowledge 
must be accounted for, as only the farmer can know whether newly designed tools and 
techniques are realistic and suitable for their own circumstances.  This does not mean that 
local people always know best, or that poor people do not mix well with modernity and 
should therefore cling to their traditional livelihood systems.  Enormous material 
advances have come from experts, advances that can be transferred from the laboratory to 
the field.  Advocates of participatory development argue that local knowledge and 
priorities must work alongside and in tandem with modern, scientific knowledge in order 
to transfer the highest possible benefit to developing countries.  
 The often cited case of animal-drawn wheeled tool-carriers is a perfect example of 
how a top-down development intervention that ignores local knowledge and local 
realities can fail to reach its goals.  The idea of development professionals was to create a 
multipurpose, mobile tool-carrier that can be used for ploughing, seeding, weeding, and 
transport (Starkey 1988).  Farmers roundly rejected this technology on a consistent basis; 
it was costly, too heavy, hard to manoeuvre, inconvenient, complicated, and more risky 
than having a selection of different single-purpose tools (Chambers 1997: 21).  
Approximately 10,000 of the tool-carriers were made at a cost of over $40 million before 
it was finally realized that farmers would not use them, something that could have been 
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gleaned much earlier by allowing the intended beneficiaries to participate in the 
development process (Ibid). 
 A top-down development strategy can also lead to poorly targeted research due to 
the outsiders’ distorted view of what kinds of improvements are needed.  For example, 
development research has repeatedly concentrated on what is marketable and exportable 
rather than what is consumed locally.  In terms of farming, this means that very little 
research goes into improving subsistence farming techniques as compared to the research 
dedicated to improving the cultivation of cash crops for export, valuing crops such as tea, 
cotton, coffee and cocoa over the staples of the rural poor such as millet, sorghum, 
cassava and yams.  In Zambia, despite the fact that cassava is the basic staple for the rural 
poor, it does not appear on agricultural production surveys, and has “only one solitary 
research agronomist working on cassava” (Chambers 1983: 77).  In terms of the raising 
and use of livestock, this has meant an enormous neglect of research regarding donkeys 
and goats despite their widespread use among the poor in the developing world.   
 Farming research offers a good example of the way in which lack of participation 
can stifle development.  In Challenging the Professions (1993), Chambers describes the 
way in which development professionals view of the problem of the refusal of farmers in 
the developing world to adopt new technologies has evolved.  In the 1950s and 1960s, the 
first decades of contemporary development, development experts blamed the farmers’ 
non-adoption on ignorance, and the solution was therefore education (Chambers 1993: 
67).  In the 1970s and 1980s, the problem was seen as farm-level constraints, such as 
scale and cost of inputs; the solution was to remove these constraints by supplying the 
inputs (Ibid).  When that strategy failed, development experts finally realized in the 
1990s that the technology does not fit, and began to go about designing technology that 
farmers actually wanted through a participatory process (Chambers 1993: 67).  While it is 
clear that these shifts have been oversimplified, the evolution of development experts’ 
attitude toward the poor rate of technology transfer for third world farmers is a revealing 
microcosm of development practice as a whole.  In many cases, it is not the ignorance of 
the intended beneficiary that is the problem, but the arrogance of the development expert. 
 The top-down development strategy falls in line with a modernist view of 
development.  The underdeveloped global South is seen as poor because it is not as far 
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along on a natural and linear development process that all countries experience.  The 
solution is to help these underdeveloped countries ‘catch-up’ through transfers of 
knowledge and technology from the modernized developed global North.   
In theory, this modernist view has few supporters, as most academics have 
recognized that it would be impossible for a state to develop in the same fashion as the 
global North developed due to a completely different global economic context.  However, 
in practice modernization still seems to be the dominant theory, as practitioners 
continually attempt to impart their modern ways of doing things on the “backward” 
South.  Romantic notions of the preeminence of traditional ways of life and local 
knowledge is not being argued here, but rather a “best of both” situation in which 
empirical and general knowledge of the modern is combined with local context specific 
knowledge: 
The question now is to assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of outsiders’ and rural 
people’s knowledge, and to see how the strengths may be combined and the weaknesses 
neutralized. (Chambers 1983: 93) 
 
 The state of underdevelopment that characterizes much of the world and the 
poverty and inequality associated with it is not due merely to a lack of proper 
development interventions.  There are structural causes as well, as the global economic 
system works to create winners (mainly in the global North) and losers (mainly in the 
global South).  Therefore, development experts must take into account systems of 
oppression and exploitation if they aim to reverse these processes.  Development 
strategies based on modernism rarely address these systemic issues.   
Participation addresses the systemic oppression and exploitation of the global 
South in at least one way; through empowerment.  By empowering the poor and 
marginalized, participation at the very least confronts the issue of powerlessness.  When 
poor and marginalized people are empowered, they are able to engage development 
processes themselves, and the structure of the system must change in order to allow for 
their newfound empowerment, or otherwise crush it.  
 
2.3 Participation  
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In order to avoid the downfalls of top-down development, many have argued that 
a new strategy of development should be envisioned that encourages a much higher 
degree of participation.  Development experts must not start with their own priorities, but 
instead determine the priorities of the poor and start from there.  Using this strategy, 
development professionals can work with poor people to design development 
interventions that assist the poor and create new opportunities for improvement without 
destroying or disrupting already existing livelihood strategies.   
 Chambers explains the “new development paradigm” that is needed as having 
four interacting conceptual levels: normative, empirical, conceptual and practical 
(Chambers 1993: 10).  At the normative level, development should be people-centered, 
putting people and their priorities ahead of things, such as the construction of new 
buildings, and putting the poorest people before the less poor (Ibid).  Empirically, there 
are four elements, two of which are particularly relevant here; poor rural people are 
knowledgeable, and rural people are capable of self-reliant organization (Ibid).   
Conceptually, it is important to remember that development is not a linear process 
as it is viewed under modernization theory, but rather a complex process of adaptation to 
a changing global and local economic environment (Ibid).  In addition, an important 
conceptual underpinning that justifies the new emphasis on participation is 
empowerment, both mentally and physically.  Giving control over development projects 
to the intended beneficiaries will give local people a sense of ownership over the process 
and the outcomes.  In the past, local people have often been involved with development 
projects only as recipients and therefore do not feel as responsible for their success.  
Without being involved in the design and planning phases and excluded from the 
monitoring process, local people have justifiably failed to take ownership of development 
outcomes.  How can those targeted for development be expected to take ownership of a 
result, whether negative or positive, when they were not even allowed to determine on 
what criteria to base the success of the project?  Thus, by allowing the local people to 
control all phases of the project, including design, planning, implementation, and 
monitoring, development professionals will give people a much more important role both 
literally and mentally.   
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Not only will using a participatory approach give the intended beneficiaries a 
greater sense of ownership over the project, but it will also give local people greater 
confidence regarding their personal abilities.  Poor, uneducated and illiterate people tend 
to also have low self-confidence, reinforcing their relative lack of skills.  However, 
participatory development projects can demonstrate to people of what they are capable: 
And we thought we were so foolish because we could not write. Yet look, we had all this 
information inside us. –quote from a Zimbabwean woman after modeling and 
diagramming a part of a rural development project (Chambers 1997: 130).  
 
Thus, the very process of participating in a development project can mentally empower 
poor people to be more confident in themselves and their abilities, in some cases making 
them aware of capabilities they did not know they had.  
On a practical level, the “new development paradigm” means emphasizing 
decentralization and empowerment, allowing poor people to control their own lives and 
their own development (Ibid: 12).  In terms of poverty research, poor people should be 
able to create their own criteria of economic well-being beyond simple per capita 
incomes.  Poverty research using this participatory technique has revealed what can be 
termed “sustainable livelihood security” that includes many factors that determine a 
household’s economic well-being (Ibid: 92).  The factors that poor people include vary 
by person, location, and time, underscoring the importance of creating context-specific 
solutions in the interest of poverty alleviation.  
More specifically, a participatory development project uses a range of approaches 
and methods meant to give the intended beneficiaries control over their own 
development.  The most important strategy is to have local people doing the actual 
activities involved.  The power and control over the project must be handed over to the 
people with whom the project is concerned (Chambers 1997: 117).  In terms of methods, 
this means that local people interview, map, model, rank, score, analyse, diagram, 
present, plan, observe, list, compare, count, estimate, act, monitor, and evaluate: 
In consequence, they [local people] are more in command of the process, they own and 
retain more of the information, and they are better placed to identify their priorities for 
action, and to determine and control that action. (Chambers 1997: 132) 
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In terms of behavior and attitude of the development professional, this means 
trusting that local people can complete these tasks, and that it is necessary to listen, learn, 
relax, embrace error, and respect the community (Ibid: 117).  The main aim is to have 
local people do all the activities involved with the design, planning, implementation and 
monitoring of a development project.  The job of the development professional is then to 
facilitate and support rather than control and direct.   
 
2.3.1 Levels of Participation 
 As the discussion so far has shown, advocates of participation believe it 
transcends the problems created by top down approaches by empowering the 
beneficiaries of projects to contribute their knowledge and help shape better project 
outcomes. Yet as the following shows, participation can take on different forms.  The 
assertion that more participation is needed in development projects begs the question, 
how much participation is enough?  And how does one determine the level of 
participation in a given development project? 
 To answer these questions, it is useful to review Jules Pretty’s (1995) ‘typology of 
participation’ in “Participatory Learning for Sustainable Agriculture”.  Pretty’s typology 
builds upon Arnstein’s (1969) “Ladder of Citizen Participation”, and is more suited for 
development projects (where Arnstein’s was designed for planning theory).  Despite its 
necessary simplicity, Pretty’s typology can provide a frame of reference in order to 
classify the level of participation in a development project.  Table 2.1 lists and describes 
Pretty’s seven levels of participation in development projects.   
  







1.Manipulative       
Participation 
Participation is simply a pretence; beneficiary group representatives on official 




People participate by being told what has been decided or has already 
happened. Unilateral announcements are made by administration or project 
management without listening to people’s responses. The information being 






People participate by being consulted or by answering questions. External 
agents define problems and information gathering processes, and thus control 
analysis. The process does not concede any share in decision-making and 





People participate by contributing resources, for example labour, in return for 
food, cash or other material incentives. They are involved in neither the 
experimentation nor the process of learning. It is very often common to see this 
called participation, yet people have no stake in prolonging technologies or 




Participation is seen by the external agencies as a means to achieve project 
goals, such as reduced costs or increased efficiency. People may participate by 
forming groups to meet predetermined objectives related to the project. Such 
involvement may be interactive and involve shared decision-making, but tends 
to arise only after major decisions have already being made by external agents. 




People participate in joint analysis, development of action plans and formation 
or strengthening of local institutions. Participation is seen as a right, not just as 
a means to achieve project goals. The process involves interdisciplinary 
methodologies that seek multiple perspectives and make use of systemic and 
structured learning processes. As groups take control over local decisions and 
determine how available resources are used, so they have a stake in 




People participate by taking initiatives independently of external institutions to 
change systems. They develop contacts with external institutions for resource 
and technical advice they need, but retain control over how resources are used. 
Self-mobilization can spread if governments and NGOs provide an enabling 
framework of support. Such self-initiated mobilization may or may not 
challenge existing distributions of wealth and power. 
 
 
 Using Pretty’s typology, it is evident that the level of participation for any 
development project that wishes to give the intended beneficiaries equal power to outside 
experts should be either 6, interactive participation, or 7, self-mobilization.  At these 
levels of participation, development is people-centered, local people are empowered, 
local knowledge respected and utilized, and the intended beneficiaries necessarily have a 
vested interest in the project.    
 
2.4 Participation Leading to More Successful Development Outcomes 
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 A greater degree of participation in development projects has been shown to lead 
to better outcomes.  Most studies that attempt to demonstrate this causality focus on a 
small number of specific case studies due to the large amount of detailed information 
required to make a determination on the level of participation involved.  A discussion of 
the merits and limitations of case study research is included in the methodology section in 
Chapter 1.   
One early example of case study research that reveals the virtues of participatory 
development strategies is David Korten’s study of five successful rural Asian 
development projects.  The author attempts to demonstrate the positive affects of a 
participatory process by examining in detail the methods and strategies used in the five 
projects (Korten 1980).  The author notes that each of the projects shares three 
characteristics: 
…each involves a rural development effort which seeks to engage rural people in their 
own advancement; each is generally recognized as more successful than the average; and 
each is dependent on effective program action more than on a uniquely favorable setting. 
(Korten 1980: 485) 
 
The study finds that the success of the five projects was due to their use of a three stage 
participatory learning process; learning to be effective, learning to be efficient, and 
learning to expand (Korten 1980: 502).  In support of Chambers’ contention that a 
participatory process must embrace error, the study advocates an experimental learning 
by doing method (Ibid).   Not only is the success of participatory development processes 
lauded, but the reader is also cautioned that such projects should start small and learn to 
be effective and efficient before expanding.   
Not all research on the success of participatory development projects focuses on a 
small number of case studies.  An important 1995 World Bank study set out to prove 
causality through a review of 121 diverse rural water projects (Isham et al).  The study 
had several significant findings.  First, it demonstrated a strong association between 
project performance and beneficiary participation (Ibid: 196).  Next, it addressed the 
often repeated criticism that the association does not indicate causality, and the 
possibility that projects that perform well illicit higher levels of participation due to their 
success.  The authors exposed that levels of participation for most of the successful 
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projects was high from the very beginning (in the planning and design phases), well 
before anyone could determine the success of the project as a factor in deciding whether 
or not to participate (Ibid: 194).  The authors also measured success and participation at 
each individual stage of the project, and found that participation in early stages was 
similarly associated with success in the early stages just as it was overall (Ibid).  
 
2.5 Participation as a Means or an End 
 While the success that a participatory process engenders in development 
outcomes is important, equally important is the empowering effect of the process itself, 
regardless of the outcome.  Participation should thus be viewed as both a means (for 
better development outcomes and efficiency) and an end in itself (in the interest of the 
empowerment of the poor).  Seen in the light of empowerment, participation changes 
from a depoliticized, technical intervention to a highly political, emancipating and radical 
idea: 
Whereas participation as a means is politically neutral insofar as it does not address 
power differentials, participation as an end has an emancipatory, politically radical 
component in that it seeks to redress unequal power relations. (Parfitt 2004: 539) 
 
 In order to achieve its empowering and emancipating goals, participatory 
development must account for differences within communities.  If power differentials are 
ignored, any benefits from a development project will likely be captured by the more 
powerful members of the community (local elite), as has often been the case with rural 
development projects in the past (Parfitt 2004: 539).  Differences in gender, age, wealth, 
and ethnicity need to be accounted for to avoid the continued isolation and exploitation of 
oppressed segments of society.   
Numerous methods can be employed to account for such differences, such as 
having local people rank different community members’ economic and social well-being, 
and having separate meetings with women and men, young and old, or subsistence 
farmers and wage-earners.  Once differences are made clear, it is easier to see who in the 
community needs empowerment.  At some point, the different groups should be brought 
together in order to form a consensus on necessary action, with the poorest and most 
disempowered people in the community being given the highest priority.   
 29 
…PRA [participation] holds great potential for helping people address and resolve 
conflict, because of its emphasis on communication skills. It is necessary for development 
workers to recognize that conflict as a political process is present in any community, and 
to become skilled in the facilitation and arbitration of conflicts as they arise through the 




In addition to empowering the poorest and most disadvantaged within the 
community in contrast to local elites, empowerment must also be seen on a larger scale.  
The global economic and political system also has the effect of disempowering certain 
groups on a much larger scale, and these macro-issues should be considered and actively 
confronted: 
…we cannot expect participation to deliver meaningful political transformation if it is not 
coupled with a thorough analysis of how development as a process—capitalist, modernist, 
and so forth—rather than development as ‘willed policy and action’, produces the 
conditions under which social exclusion proliferates. (Ervine 2010: 775) 
 
The capitalist and modernist obsession with efficiency is one area that 
participatory development attempts to challenge.  Participation cannot be sold solely as a 
means to greater efficiency: 
This resort to a discourse of participation as means effectively re-inscribes the primacy of 
a top-down logic of the need to achieve measurable objectives efficiently. Thus, power 
re-enters the equation incognito under the guise of the demands of efficiency. (Parfitt 
2004: 544) 
 
Although participatory development has two key interacting goals, empowerment of the 
excluded and better development outcomes, the goal of empowerment must reign 
supreme.  According to advocates of popular participation, if empowerment is sacrificed 
for efficiency, parts of society will continue to be neglected and excluded from 
development.  
 
2.6 Participation Embraced in Theory, Resisted in Practice 
 Theoretically, participatory development is an ethos which has received strong 
support and endorsement.  From far-left academics to the IMF and World Bank, a wide 
                                                 
7
 PRA refers to “Participatory Rural Appraisal”, one of several approaches in participation. 
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array of development actors have declared that encouraging participation in development 
projects is important and worthwhile.   
 However, while participation has been hailed publicly and theoretically, in 
practice many of its most important tenets have been ignored or resisted.  In part, the 
reason behind this resistance is undoubtedly the natural tendency of institutions to resist 
change.  Many development institutions may find it difficult to encourage participation in 
practice due to several logistical factors: donors and upper-management prefer fixed 
schedules and budgets to flexibility, set time-frames rather than the patience required for 
participation, and avoiding, ignoring, or hiding error rather than embracing them as part 
of an experimental process.  Multilateral bank personnel are professionally rewarded for 
big projects and dispersing funds and punished for delays that are often necessary to 
ensure a sufficient level of participation: 
….multilateral bank staff members have tended to be evaluated and rewarded for the size 
of the loans and grants they negotiate, and then the speed with which these are disbursed. 
Delays have been seen not as savings, as necessary for participation, as economies or 
opportunities to learn, or as needed for local differentiation and fit, but as ‘slippage’. 
(Chambers 1997: 66) 
 
Institutions can be further reluctant to hand over control to local people through 
interactive participation because it lowers the institution’s ability to directly affect the 
project outcome.  Additionally, the World Bank staff has traditionally been dominated by 
economists who greatly outnumber, outrank, and exert greater influence than the small 
number of sociologists and social anthropologists with whom they work (Ibid: 49).   
 Yet there are other explanations for the tendency to embrace participation on 
paper and resist it in practice that assert the trend is purposeful and not merely the result 
of institutional structures.  Many critics of the new focus on participation assert that 
participation is being used as a neo-liberal strategy of dominance through inclusion, as 
certain voices and interests are invited to participate in pre-defined spaces, while 
undesirable radical forces that aim to truly alter normalized power relations are pushed 
aside and delegitimized.  Miraftab (2006) describes the way the neo-liberal paradigm has 
created ‘invited’ spaces of participation that seek to allow only for action that does not 
disrupt normalized power relations: 
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‘Invited’ spaces are defined as occupied by those grassroots actions and their allied NGOs 
that are legitimized by donors and government intervention. ‘Invented’ spaces are defined 
as occupied by those collective actions by the poor that directly confront the authorities 
and challenge the status quo…in one space, strategies cope within the existing structure; 
in the other, resistance is mounted to change it. Grassroots activities move back and forth 
between those spaces. Institutions of power, such as the mainstream media, the state and 
international donor organizations, however, configure these spaces in a binary relation, 
and tend to criminalize the latter by designating only the former as the ‘proper’ space for 
civil participation. (Miraftab 2006: 195) 
 
In this way, elites are able to allow only for participation that does not challenge existing 
power structures by delegitimizing ‘invented’ spaces as destructive and even criminal.  
 The degree of support shown by institutions of power when confronted with 
different developmental approaches often hinges on whether or not their power will be 
challenged or limited by the approach.  In Rural Development (1983), Chambers 
constructs a scale of the “acceptability of rural development approaches to local and other 
elites” (164).  The most acceptable approaches address physical weakness; feeding 
programmes, family planning, and curative health programs for example (Ibid).  Such 
programs do not address empowerment and do not challenge normalized power relations.  
Slightly less acceptable approaches address the issue of isolation, and include the 
construction of roads, and the improvement and extension of education and other public 
services (Ibid).  Approaches that address vulnerability, such as seasonal public works, 
seasonal credit, crop insurance, and preventative health are often only moderately 
acceptable as they decrease people’s dependence on the state and other elites for 
assistance during crises, increasing their power and freedom and thus decreasing the 
power of elites.  Even less acceptable are approaches that directly address poverty, such 
as distribution of new assets and redistribution of old assets as this is a direct challenge to 
a key foundation behind the power of elites; their relative wealth (Ibid).  On the bottom 
of the scale are strategies that directly address issues of powerlessness: legal aid, 
enforcement of liberal laws, trade unions, and political mobilization (Ibid).   
 Participatory development at the interactive or self-mobilization level directly 
addresses the issue of the powerlessness of the poor.  Participation transfers the power 
and control over poor people’s development strategy from the elites who are normally in 
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control of the resources necessary to conduct development activity to the poor people 
themselves.  In the following section, I will argue that high levels of participation do 
necessarily address the imperative of empowering poor people, and briefly discuss 
strategies to ensure that participation is not used as a neo-liberal strategy of dominance 





2.7 Achieving High Levels of Participation Through Institutional Change 
It should…be recognized that participatory development has no predetermined 
outcomes, and the space for unintended consequences—both positive and 
negative—is always present within it. (Williams 2004: 565) 
 
The criticism that participatory development can be used as a neo-liberal strategy 
of dominance through inclusion is valid.  Opinions and persons viewed as radical or 
undesirable by elites can be purposefully excluded while some of the community is 
included, and the process will still likely be labeled ‘participatory’ by the implementing 
institution.  However, just because there are negative and manipulating forms of 
participation does not make positive participation that gives real power to people at the 
bottom any less empowering and emancipating.  Many countries claim to be democracies 
while restricting who can run for election, intimidating voters and rigging elections, but 
this does not make genuine democracy any less desirable.  The task, therefore, is to 
develop strategies and policies that ensure participation is used in a genuine, all-inclusive 
fashion. 
Whether PRA [participation] is equitable and good depends on whom it involves. The 
natural tendency is for this to be men rather than women, the better-off rather than the 
worse-off, and those of higher status groups rather than those of lower status. The 
challenge is…that the weaker are identified and empowered and equity is served. 
(Chambers 1997: 217) 
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 An examination of the idea of radical or insurgent planning offers useful insight 
as to the goals that a participatory development framework should seek to achieve.  In 
“Foundations for Radical Planning” (1973), Grabow and Heskin describe the top-down, 
centrist, and modernist form most planning takes as elitist and exclusionary, and call for a 
participatory planning process: 
What one social scientist or one planner thinks-whatever his status within his discipline or 
the community-is at best of marginal interest. The question which must be asked is, under 
what conditions will it be possible for the membership of a community to articulate its 
true needs and freely form a collective idea of its preferences…both the transformation of 
the present society, whose structure hinders progress toward a truly responsive society, 
and the substance of a responsive society must draw on ever greater participation of ever 
more members of society in ever broader and deeper management of their collective 
affairs. (Grabow and Heskin 1973: 107) 
 
Radical planning uses an epistemology that accepts subjective, indigenous, and 
experimental knowledge rather than only accepting technical, scientific knowledge as is 
the case in normal planning (Friedmann 1987: 389).  Grabow and Heskin thus call for 
“participatory evolutionary experimentation” in planning to offset the centralizing, 
exclusionary, undemocratic tendency of modernist planning (1973: 111).   
 Similar to radical planning, participation must deliberately seek to “destabilize the 
normalized order of things” (Miraftab 2009: 33).  Institutional change must therefore take 
place in regards to both national governments and multilateral development agencies.  
The role of the state in the “new development paradigm” is, most importantly, to protect 
people’s rights.  
The poorer people are, the more they need secure rights. To enjoy their rights, they need 
to know what they are and how to claim them. They also often need organization and 
solidarity to overcome vested interests. (Chambers 1993: 119) 
 
By giving their citizens well-defined and well-publicized rights, the state can protect 
people from harmful forms of top-down development that can displace people from their 
land and disrupt already existing livelihood strategies.  Chapter 4 contains a larger 
discussion on rights, with specific reference to South Africa and Xolobeni.   
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 The state can also attempt to create legislation that requires popular participation 
in government and developmental activities.  In Bolivia, the government enacted the Law 
of Popular Participation in 1994 which decentralizes authority and revenue to 
municipalities and local institutions such as vigilance committees, enabling them to 
“carry out a range of planning, management and auditing activities” (Blackburn and de 
Toma 1998: 30).  Decentralization is a key strategy in encouraging participation, and can 
help to stymie the core’s tendency to suck away the surplus, skills, and labour of the 
periphery (see section 2.2) by transferring resources away from central, core locations to 
the periphery.  Not only should more revenue and authority be given to local government 
structures, but those structures must also be required to use participatory methods to 
encourage direct public participation in planning and implementation in order to avoid a 
situation in which local elites simply intercept the benefits.   
 Institutionalizing participatory strategies into hierarchically structured 
organizations is a difficult process that requires “a major reorientation of planning, 
implementation, and monitoring and evaluation systems” (Blackburn and Holland 1998: 
56).  Higher-level staff must commit to the approach, while fieldworkers and extension 
staff require “new skills and competences if they are to switch from a teaching to a 
facilitating role” (Ibid).  Flexibility in budgets and timelines is important in order to allow 
the ideas and priorities of local people take precedence over blueprints created by 
development experts.  Similar to the participatory process itself, institutions must take an 
experimental, learning-by-doing approach that invokes patience and an understanding 
that institutionalizing participation should be a medium rather than short-term goal.   
 Those who would dismiss participatory development as simply a change in 
method are missing the point.  Participatory development is more than a change in 
method; it is a change in power structure.  It addresses the issue of whether well-meaning 
outside experts or political forces have the right to intervene in poor people’s lives, and 
concludes that it is only just to do so in a collaborative manner that puts the priorities of 
the beneficiaries first.  Going beyond just a change in method, participatory development 
seeks to alter the fundamental power relations (and powerlessness of the poor) that 
underlies their poverty in the first place.  
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Critics of participatory development may also argue that institutions and 
development professionals simply cannot change in a way that empowers poor people 
because this would reduce their own power and therefore be against their self-interest.  
Conversely, advocates of participation assert that most development professionals desire 
to change the world in a way that uplifts everyone, and do not see the poverty and 
powerlessness of others as a gain for themselves.  By being aware of and confronting the 
way power relations and hierarchies affect the development process, development 




2.8 Forcing the Issue: Invited and Invented Spaces of Participation 
Spaces for participation that are created from above are known as ‘invited’ spaces 
of participation (Cornwall 2002).  Invited spaces do not always have predetermined 
outcomes, and are usually subject to contestation: 
Spaces for participation are ambiguous and unpredictable. Particular spaces may be 
produced by the powerful, but filled with those with alternative visions whose 
involvement transforms their possibilities, pushing its boundaries, changing the discourse 
and taking control. They may be created with one purpose in mind, and used by those 
who engage in it for something quite different. The temporary spaces opened up by the 
use of participatory methodologies, for example, may serve to produce new forms of 
surveillance and control or lend moral authenticity to the prescriptions of the powerful, as 
well as to create spaces for unheard voices or spark collective action to claim 
entitlements. (Cornwall 2002: 51) 
 
Thus, the concept of invited spaces of participation is neither inherently negative nor 
positive.  The danger of invited spaces is that they “may work to render other arenas for 
voice illegitimate” (Ibid: 52).  By creating invited spaces of participation for citizens, 
governments may actually be, purposefully or otherwise, including only desired voices 
while excluding and even criminalizing others.  
 When popular participation in development is denied to people by the authorities, 
strategies can form from below to participate in ways unsanctioned by the state or 
implementing institution.  Spaces of participation created by poor citizens themselves 
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have been labeled ‘invented’ spaces (Miraftab 2006).  The main difference between the 
two spaces is that invited spaces are set up and defined by the state, while invented 
spaces are created by citizens themselves and lie outside what the state considers 
acceptable citizen participation (Ibid: 195).  Invented spaces of participation therefore 
have the advantage of not having to play by a state-mandated set of rules.  Thus, invented 
spaces can confront systemic problems and the state more directly, while invited spaces 
of participation more often seek to cope with existing systems of hardship (Ibid).   
However, it is important to realize that the two spaces are not exclusive, but are 
instead:  
…in a mutually constituted, interacting relationship, not a binary one…grassroots 
activities move back and forth between those spaces. Institutions of power, such as the 
mainstream media, the state and international donor organizations, however, configure 
these spaces in a binary relation, and tend to criminalize the latter by designating only the 
former as the ‘proper’ space for civil participation. (Miraftab 2006: 195)   
 
In terms of participatory development, despite methodological strategies to mitigate 
exclusion, in all likelihood invited forms of participation will never be all-inclusive.  
Some voices will always be excluded, whether due to their lack of access and visibility 
due to spatial and societal factors, or due to political beliefs and priorities that conflict 
with state interests.  In addition, even those who are included can find invited spaces to 
be restrictive, manipulative, or dogmatic.  Invented spaces of participation will always 
have a place in the political economy of development, and as such efforts to portray 
actions in invented spaces as criminal should be viewed with a very critical eye.  In 
Chapter 4, I will examine the way in which Xolobeni residents used a variety of invited 




















Chapter Three: Historical Top-Down Development in Xolobeni  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 Participatory development, as discussed in the previous chapter, is widely 
embraced in theory.  In post-apartheid South Africa, the government has consistently 
recognized the importance of people’s participation in the development process, and even 
created a position in local government for Ward Councilors, whose chief responsibility is 
to encourage participation in government.  In practice, participatory development has 
been resisted in South Africa as sharply as it has elsewhere in the world.  The apartheid 
government used participation simply as part of a strategy to legitimize their rule in 
claiming that numerous black homelands were independent states despite their oppression 
and manipulation.  Labeling the homelands independent, the apartheid government 
attempted to shift the responsibility for the poverty in the area to the poor residents 
themselves.  In reality, people were only allowed to participate in the implementation of 
the apartheid government’s pre-designed development plans.  The fact that many of the 
development plans involved relocations with insufficient if any compensation, cattle-
culling, and limits on living space meant that those who did participate were often labeled 
collaborators or traitors, pitting residents against one another. 
 In post-apartheid South Africa, participation is still a contested ground.  The 
Constitution and other legislation that is in place do a good job of protecting people’s 
rights, including their right to control and meaningfully participate in their own 
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development.  In terms of social policy, South Africa has a moderate system of transfers 
to help the poor in the form of social grants and subsidized housing, electricity, and 
water.  However, the development strategy of the South African state has been 
characterized by a neo-liberal, private sector led approach.  If a more participatory 
approach is to be followed, South Africa needs to confront the way in which the current 
development orientation tends to constrain and limit popular participation in development 
projects.  
 This chapter discusses the four major developmental interventions that have been 
directed to the Xolobeni area.  First, the apartheid government’s Betterment Scheme is 
discussed, as well as the ensuing Mpondo revolt.  Next, the gum tree development is 
summarized, along with the resulting “Gum Tree Rebellion”.  Subsequently, the tourism 
development initiated by the EU Development Programme is examined.  The way in 
which the South African government has attempted to implement the mining project is 
then discussed, and a conclusion is drawn from the historical sequence that the South 
African government has repeatedly employed a top-down development strategy in 
projects targeting Xolobeni.  The argument is backed by a brief analysis of South 
Africa’s macro-economic development policies, which numerous scholars have 
concluded are private sector driven, and neo-liberal in character.   
 
3.2 The Betterment Scheme and Mpondo Revolt 
 In order to discuss the Betterment Scheme and the ensuing 1960 Mpondo Revolt, 
it is first necessary to understand the historical context of the Transkei at the time.  The 
Transkei was considered a semi-autonomous “homeland” for the Xhosa people by the 
apartheid government, and later went on to gain official independence in 1976.  Part of 
apartheid South Africa’s policy of “separate development”, the Transkei was thus 
officially in charge of running its own affairs and designing its own development policy, 
















Figure 3.1: Map of Former Transkei 
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3.1- Map depicting the boundaries of the former Transkei. Eastern Mpondoland refers to the area North and 
East of the Umzimvubu River. The Xolobeni Mining Project site is located at the Northeast tip of the 
former Transkei along the coast. (www.africafederation.net) 
  
In practice, the Transkei was still under the authority of the apartheid state, and its 
Chief Minister Kaiser Matanzima and his government were widely regarded as puppets 
of the apartheid government.  In terms of focusing specifically on Xolobeni, Paramount 
Chief Botha Sicgau officially ruled Xolobeni and all of Eastern Mpondoland until 1961.  
Chief Sicgau’s rule was contingent on his favor with the apartheid government, and he 
thus became perhaps the most infamous ‘traitor’ or ‘collaborator’ in Eastern 
Mpondoland.  The power of chiefs was reconstituted under white authority in 1956, and 
an important change occurred; headmen, who were previously formally independent of 
chiefly control, were now subordinated to the chiefs:   
The new source of chiefly authority lay in a new, four-tiered administrative structure 
which, by emphasizing the legitimacy of tradition, sought expressly to limit popular 
participation in decision-making and to place local government in the hands of a 
conservative elite.  (Southall 1982: 104) 
 
The apartheid government was therefore limiting citizen participation in government in 
practice, while at the same time claiming to hand over power to the local people by 
further empowering those traditional leaders that were willing to collaborate.   
 The Betterment Scheme was designed by the apartheid government in response to 
reports of rapid soil erosion and desertification in the black homelands, and had the 
additional goal of increasing agricultural output and efficiency (Hendricks 1989: 316).  
Apartheid authorities determined that the main cause for soil erosion, and a contributing 
factor to poor rates of agricultural production, was overstocking of cattle by African 
farmers: 
Africans, so the argument went, had an irrational desire to accumulate large numbers of 
livestock indiscriminately.  Their religious outlook towards stock-holding contradicted 




In typical top-down fashion, the apartheid government had decided that 
overstocking cattle was a feature of ‘backward’ African agriculture and thus, if Africans 
hoped to become modernized, it had to be curtailed.  This determination is a clear 
example of what Chambers and other proponents of participation view as a paramount 
deficiency of top-down development.  Stocking cattle was more important to an African 
farmer than on a typical white farm at the time for several reasons.  Most obvious to an 
outsider is the non-economic functions cattle served; use in cultural ceremonies such as 
funerals, weddings, and festivals, payment of bridewealth or lobola, and a way of 
displaying wealth and status.  Yet overstocking cattle also played an important economic 
role for African farmers: 
….although many commentators conclude that overstocking is almost wholly a result of 
the important non-economic functions which stock fulfill in African society, they fail to 
realize that stock also represents one of the few practicable means of capital accumulation 
for reserve inhabitants and that in impoverished societies where only a minority can 
afford to hire tractors, oxen are still extensively used for ploughing. (Southall 1982: 223) 
 
Furthermore, in many parts of the Transkei as many as 35-40 percent of people did not 
have access to arable land, and thus depended on their livestock for survival (Redding 
1996: 563).  
The government’s solution was the 1939 Control and Improvement of Livestock in 
Native Areas Proclamation, commonly called the Betterment Scheme.  Betterment had 
three main tenets; stock limitation and cattle culling, the use of fencing to limit grazing 
and separate farming land, and relocations into more densely populated areas.  For 
reasons already discussed, stock limitation and cattle culling was fiercely resisted as it 
disrupted rural Africans both economically and culturally.  
Fencing was introduced in an attempt to further limit overgrazing, ignoring the 
traditional grazing techniques of the Mpondo that involve strict rotation in order to avoid 
exhausting any particular area.  Fencing was a source of grievance as it restricted the age-
old practice of free-range grazing, while “limiting the total available grazing land, thus 
directly constraining the number of livestock that could survive and the number of people 
who could survive as livestock-owners” (Redding 1996: 563).  Additionally, the funds 
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required for fencing were often raised by increasing stock levies, dealing yet another 
blow to stock-owners (Ibid: 564).   
Relocations of homesteads were introduced by the government as a strategy to 
‘rationalise’ the supposedly random and unplanned settlement patterns of the local 
people.  Rural locations were to be separated into residential, cultivation and grazing 
units, with homesteads arranged together in village-like settlements (J Pieterse 2007: 67).  
Local residents were thus made to abandon their huts, entailing “the abandonment of 
prior capital investment”, and were usually either grossly undercompensated or not 
compensated at all (Southall 1982: 107; Hendricks 1989: 321). 
Along with the loss of capital investment, residents also disliked several elements 
of the new, more densely populated village-like settlements.  First, residents disliked 
living in close proximity of relative strangers, complaining of loss of privacy, theft, and 
intrusions, indicating that the relocations disrupted social cohesion (McAllister 1989: 
359).  Secondly, the new homestead sites were limited in size, thus limiting both the 
number of structures one can build and the size of one’s vegetable garden.  Vegetable 
gardens were an extremely important source of production for those living in the area, 
and were often even more important than the use of fields (McAllister 1989).  While 
fields were usually situated some distance away from the homestead, gardens were 
located immediately next to the homestead, were far more fertile, and were used to 
produce a variety of different consumable staples (Ibid).  Gardens sometimes grew to as 
much as 6 to 7 acres in size, a situation that became impossible under the new site 
restrictions of about 0.25 hectares per site (less than one acre) (McAllister 1989: 352, 
362).   
The resistance of the Mpondo people to the Betterment Scheme was fierce and 
organized, especially in Eastern Mpondoland.  In Mbizana specifically
8
, local residents 
were sharply opposing Betterment as early as 1957, as evidenced by a public meeting 
meant to explain the program in which Chief Sicgau was eventually jeered and not 
allowed to speak (J Pieterse 2007: 69).  As the authorities attempted to implement 
Betterment, resistance tactics moved to the burning of huts, beatings, and sometimes 
                                                 
8
 The Mbizana municipality includes Xolobeni. 
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murder of collaborators, forcing collaborating headmen and chiefs to either flee the area 
or face the people’s wrath (Southall 1982: 110; J Pieterse 2007: 88-91).  
Originating from the Makhuluspani movement, a set of vigilante groups that 
formed in the 1950s to combat cattle theft, the organization evolved by 1960 to become 
‘Ikongo’ (Congress) with a leadership known as ‘Intaba’ (the hill) (Southall 1982: 109; 
Redding 1996: 572).  Ikongo used the aforementioned intimidation and violence against 
headmen and other Bantu Administration figures so well that by October 1960, the four 
biggest centers of Eastern Mpondoland were no longer in control of the government (J 
Pieterse 2007: 96).  The group was well organized enough to create judicial settlement 
structures to replace those of the absent government, and also obtained a defense fund for 
arrested rebels by collecting levies from homesteads and traders (Southall 1982: 110-11).   
The reasons for the outbreak of such a fierce and well-organized resistance were 
due to both the features of Betterment that amounted to attack on the Mpondo’s 
livelihood systems, as well as widespread rejection of the undemocratic and distorted 
character of chiefly authority under white rule.  The people felt that their chiefs and 
headmen were collaborators who did not represent their interest, and this grievance was 
aggravated by an attempt to implement a disruptive top-down development intervention 
that was designed without any local participation.  The ensuing revolt was impressive in 
its organization, but its success was limited to a short time-frame. 
Faced with a violent popular revolt in a rural homeland, the apartheid government 
reacted with a predictable amount of draconian repression, and the revolt was crushed by 
force.  After the declaration of a state of emergency throughout the entire Transkei in 
November of 1960, security forces were allowed to detain suspects without trial, leading 
to the arrest of 5,000 people between 1960 and 1963, 2,000 of whom were eventually 
tried (Redding 1996: 576; Southall 1982: 113).  Hundreds of Mpondo were killed in the 
crackdown, and by 1963 the area was once again firmly in government control (Ibid).   
For the apartheid state, whose goal it was to control and exploit the Transkei 
through a system of indirect rule, the lesson taken from the revolt was that “there could 
be no genuine relaxation of political control” (Southall 1982: 114).  The Betterment 
Scheme was constructed by outside experts who aimed to curtail soil erosion and 
desertification while increasing agricultural output and efficiency, a technocratic 
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approach to development.  The people of Eastern Mpondoland fought the intervention 
with a grassroots, organized, and violent resistance.  As a result, Betterment was never 
fully implemented in the area, but many Mpondos died or were imprisoned as a price for 
their resistance efforts.   
 Officials in the apartheid government aimed to encourage participation in the 
implementation of Betterment, stating as early as 1956 that “Africans were to get 
involved and participate actively in their own ‘development’” (Hendricks 1989: 317).  If 
the Betterment Scheme is applied to Pretty’s (1995) typology of participation, the 
Betterment Scheme used a combination of manipulative and functional participation.  All 
real decision-making power came from the apartheid government, and local people were 
excluded from the design and planning stages.  Local government structures, which were 
not representative of the people anyway, had no real power and were simply charged with 
implementing the plan in order to reduce costs.  Thus, the local people who did 
participate were simply co-opted to serve external goals.  In Chapter 4, I will provide 
evidence that the experience of Betterment makes up an important part of the mPondo 
people’s identity, and continues to inform people’s struggle against the mining project. 
 
3.3 The Gum Tree Rebellion 
 The case of a planned gum tree development in 1999 is indicative of how a 
seemingly straightforward development intervention can be extremely harmful if local 
participation is stifled.  Sappi Limited, a multinational pulp and paper company based in 
South Africa, came to the Xolobeni community with a plan to grow and harvest gum 
trees.  Community members would be paid by Sappi to plant gum trees on their land in a 
rental system in which Sappi pays for the use of the land the gum trees occupy.  When 
the gum trees reached maturity, Sappi would pay community members to cut them down 
and then take the wood to their factory.  Sappi has and continues to employ this 
relationship with poor rural people in different parts of the global south, including in 
KwaZulu-Natal.   
 The plan ran into community opposition for two main reasons; concerns regarding 
whether or not it would be a proper use of land, and a feeling that the community was not 
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properly consulted.  In terms of land use, many local residents felt that planting gum trees 
was not the most beneficial use of the land for the community as a whole.   
Gum trees are well known for the amount of water they steal from their surroundings.  
Many people were opposed to planting these trees that would take water and land away 
from farming and grazing and put it into a program that would only benefit a small 




Thus, residents were concerned that the gum trees would disrupt their livelihood systems, 
of which farming and grazing are paramount, and that the benefits of the scheme would 
be unfairly distributed.   
 In addition, many residents disliked the way the plan was presented to the 
community, claiming that one relatively wealthy family attempted to intimidate and 
mislead other residents into accepting the plan.  Residents were also concerned that only 
certain people knew all the information while key details were kept from the majority of 
local people, contributing to their fear that the benefits would not be fairly and evenly 
distributed.
10
   
 The division created in the community over the gum tree development came to a 
climax during a two week period in 1999 in which 14 homesteads that had been ploughed 
to plant gum trees were burnt to the ground (Noseweek 2008).  Similar to the Mpondo 
Revolt, the “Gum Tree Rebellion” was thus caused by a top-down development plan that 
did not allow for local people’s participation and that had the potential to disrupt people’s 
already existing livelihood systems.   
In contrast to the Betterment Scheme, the gum tree development plan was not 
designed and implemented by the government, but instead by a private for-profit 
company.  Yet the conflict, violence, and harm caused by the development intervention 
can still be largely attributed by a lack of participation in the process.  Had the 
community’s concerns been dealt with in a transparent and straightforward manner, it is 
likely that the situation would have been resolved without violence and destruction.  The 
conflict resolution capabilities of participatory techniques are thus highlighted by their 
absence in the gum tree case.  
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 In terms of Pretty’s (1995) typology, the Gum Tree Development entailed 
participation for material incentives.  People were encouraged by Sappi to participate by 
contributing resources, including their land and labour, in exchange for money.  Most of 
the local people rejected this plan to the extent that they even attacked the property of 
those who cooperated with Sappi.   
 
3.4 Eco-tourism and AmaDiba Adventures 
 The European Union funded ‘Wild Coast Spatial Development Initiative Pilot 
Programme’ (EU Programme) was initiated in 1999 aimed to achieve economic and 
social development of previously disadvantaged communities through nature-based 
tourism, as well as building local capabilities regarding tourism operations and 
management (Background Document 2001).  The programme was meant to cover the 
entire Wild Coast.  In Xolobeni specifically, a hiking and horse-riding trail and two rest 
camps were constructed along the coast.   
 Initially, the programme was seen as a success.  Numerous community members 
were trained in eco-tourism activities, including trained guides, trail and camp 
maintenance, as well as management and marketing of tourism operations (Midterm 
Review 2003).  Local residents were employed for almost all parts of the operation, 
including the construction and maintenance of the trails and camps, tending and supply of 
horses, caterers for the two camps, and community guides (Ibid).  Tourists began to 
trickle in, and a fly-fishing company was formed that shared profits with the community 
(Ibid).   
 Unfortunately, the programme was not able to sustain its success after the EU 
initiators withdrew, leaving the management of AmaDiba Adventures to local residents 
and a local NGO, PondoCROP.  It is likely that PondoCROP lacked the capacity to 
effectively assist in management, while local residents turned out to be insufficiently 
trained during the earlier stages (Wright 2005).  Currently, the fly-fishing business is 
non-existent, only one of the two rest camps is operating while both are in need of 
renovation, and the number of tourists is extremely limited.
11
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 Interview with Nonhle Mbuthuma, 19/02/11; Interview with Mzamo Dlamini, 19/02/11; Interview with 
Zeka Mnyamana, 19/02/11 (All worked with AmaDiba Adventures). 
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 There are several reasons for the eventual failure of AmaDiba Adventures.  One 
major issue was the theft of over 400 000 rand of AmaDiba funds by a PondoCROP 
employee charged with overseeing finances (AmaDiba Adventures Forensic 
Investigation).  In addition, Zamile Qunya, MRC/TEM’s community liaison, is alleged to 
have sabotaged the tourism operation in order to make way for the mining.  In order to 
disperse profits to the community and help manage AmaDiba Adventures, a community 
trust was created entitled Accoda Trust.  The board of Accoda was elected by the 
community, and the board could be replaced if the community felt it necessary.  The 
former director of Accoda Trust, Philip Ndlovela, along with several AmaDiba 
Adventures employees, alleges that Zamile Qunya, another Accoda board member, also 
stole funds from Accoda.
12
  Qunya is also accused of failing to pass on important 
information, accepting tourist reservations without appointing a guide or telling the 
caterers to prepare food.  Furthermore, Colin Bell, former CEO of Wilderness Safaris, 
alleges that Qunya sabotaged an agreement between his company and AmaDiba 
Adventures in which Wilderness Safaris would have expanded the operation, accepting 
75 percent of the financial risk while giving the community 85 percent of the profits.
13
  
 In addition to the obstacles posed by Qunya and PondoCROP, the eventual failure 
of AmaDiba Adventures appears to be due to a lack of ownership by the community due 
to a lack of participation: 
Community respondent 2, with support from community respondent 1 and community 
respondent 3, argues that the programme had “…no proper involvement, local 
government was not approached and consultation with community was passive, with 
people being told what they were to do”. Community respondent 2 notes that this 
approach resulted in a lack of ownership and commitment, “… people have just sat, 
watched, listened and showed no ‘passion’ for the programme … there are people 
involved with this ecotourism who are just interested in the money because they don’t 
have passion as the ideas they had were not used, they are just doing what was said  ...  
they feel that they are not involved … It’s like spoon-feeding people, they cannot do it 
themselves…we don’t feel like it is for the community”. (Wright 2005: 70) 
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 Interview with Philip Ndlovela, 22/02/11; Interview with Nonhle Mbuthuma, 19/02/11; Interview with 
Mzamo Dlamini, 19/02/11. 
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 Interview with Colin Bell, 22/03/11. 
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The claims of the community respondents were backed up by both the Midterm Review 
(2003) and the programme training manager, who claimed: 
programme management did not understand the beneficiary community, “The programme 
was dominated by white people, for the development of black people … they did not 
know how to go about this development … the black voices in the programme were not 
heard, not listened to … they [the black people] had a better understanding of their 
communities”. (Wright 2005: 80) 
 
 Not only were local residents merely passive recipients of the tourism 
development, but local government were also largely excluded from the process.  The 
Midterm Review (2003) asserts that insufficient steps were taken to ensure local 
government institutions would take ownership of the project.  Local residents involved in 
the project complained that the exclusion of local government made government officials 
feel “alienated”, hindering cooperation with residents involved in tourism (Wright 2005: 
77).  The local government’s hostility towards the tourism development likely 
contributed to their steadfast support of the mining project, as discussed in section 3.6, as 
they had no reason to protect the tourism industry. 
 Much like Betterment and the gum tree development, the EU Programme suffered 
from a lack of popular participation.  Involving local residents in the planning and design 
of the project would have likely increased people’s stake in the project, giving them a 
sense of ownership and empowerment as opposed to their sense of being “spoon-fed”.  
Unlike Betterment and the gum tree development, however, the programme did not 
infringe on any pre-existing livelihood strategies.  As a result, instead of being fiercely 
resisted by the community, the programme merely floundered once the substantial 
financial, managerial, and technical support of the EU Development Programme made its 
scheduled departure.  
 In terms of Pretty’s (1995) typology, the EU Programme constituted functional 
participation.  Groups such as Accoda Trust were formed to meet predetermined 
objectives related to the project.  Most major decisions were made without the input of 
local people by the EU project management.  However, while AmaDiba Adventures is 
barely running currently, the programme may have opened the way for self-mobilization 
(Pretty’s highest level of participation) by the Xolobeni community to develop their own 
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tourism industry in the future.  Many community members, in their evaluations of the 
project, “argue that the community needs to change their current practice of waiting for 
the funders to come to them; ‘…listening to the funders and being driven by the funders 
and not by us driving the funding’” (Wright 2005: 74).  Perhaps local people will initiate 
their own tourism development in the future due to their experience with AmaDiba 
Adventures.  
 
3.5 The Xolobeni Mineral Sands Project 
As noted in the introduction, the Xolobeni Mineral Sands Project is a proposed 
mining project along coastal AmaDiba. MRC/TEM has claimed universal community 
support for its proposed mine in its annual reports, press releases, and applications 
submitted to the Department of Mineral Affairs (labeled the Department of Minerals and 
Energy until 2009). However, it is clear that there is significant opposition to the mining 
project from the local community.  Numerous demonstrations have been organized by the 
community to oppose the mining project, most notably at the announcement of the 
approval of the mining right in 2008 which forced the then Minister of the Department of 
Minerals and Energy Buyelwa Sonjica to leave the combined announcement and 
celebration early.  According to community respondent and ACC board member Nonhle 




The field research conducted for this dissertation indicates that an overwhelming 
majority of community members interviewed oppose the mining project.  Of the 26 
community respondents, only 4 professed support for the mining project.  The other 22 
respondents not only stated that they strongly oppose the mining, but went on to assert 
that those who did support the mining were in an extreme minority.  The level of 
opposition was so strong that the majority of respondents indicated that they would be 
willing to both kill and die to stop the mine from coming to their land.  The conclusion 
that the Xolobeni people have roundly rejected the mine is also supported by Andrew 
Bennie’s 2010 unpublished master’s thesis, which consisted of 21 small-scale surveys, 15 
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 Interview with Nonhle Mbuthuma, 19/02/11. 
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interviews and numerous informal conversations with community members (Bennie 
2010: 9).   
At least a partial factor contributing to the local people’s opposition to the mining 
project is the way the mining company conducted the consultation process.  Nearly all 
community respondents claimed that during the consultations, rather than asking for 
permission to mine the land, MRC/TEM informed the community there would be mining, 
listed the supposed benefits, and asked if there were any questions: 
The consultation was not serious, it was just them saying we are going to mine and take 
your land, they didn’t listen at all. One counselor for the chief at the meeting asked, ‘why 
don’t you go from house to house and ask people to sign their permission,’ they 
answered, ‘people would say no so we must just tell them.’ 
15
 
The fact that MRC/TEM ended up submitting a document of forged community 
signatures to the Department of Minerals and Energy supports the respondent’s claims.
16
  
Many community respondents expressed disappointment in the government for 
not playing a proper role as mediator in the consultation process.  They seemed to feel 
that the government was meant to present both the positive and negative effects of a 
potential mine in a fair and balanced manner, and then ask the community if they agreed 
to host the mine.  Instead, the government attempted to push the mining project on the 
residents.  Recently elected Ward Councilor Dimane had the following to say about the 
government’s role: 
The national government was on the side of pushing the mining through.  They told me 
you shouldn’t talk to these local people much because we are going to force the mine 




 The local municipal government was also widely accused of attempting to force 
the mining project on the community.  Many respondents claimed that the municipality 
would even use jobs and municipal services as a bargaining chip: 
The people came [to the consultations] and everything had been decided, they did not 
come to ask if they can mine… the people who support the mine were paid and promised 
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 Small group interview with S. Dlamini, Mfekethwa, and Mdumiseni, 20/02/11. S. Dlamini quoted.  
16
 Amadiba Crisis Committee’s Internal Appeal to the Minister of Minerals and Energy Against the Award 
of a Mining Right to Transworld Energy and Mineral Resources (SA) (PTY) LTD, September 2008  
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 Interview with Ward Counselor Dimane, 22/02/11.  
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jobs.  The municipality even said that if people do not want the mine they will not get 




Even those interviewed who supported the mine did not defend the consultation process, 
instead arguing that the government should not have to ask the people permission 
because the people elected them.
19
 
A major claim by MRC/TEM and the South African government is that the 
existence of the Xolobeni Empowerment Company (Xolco), a community-based BEE 
company with a 26 percent stake in TEM charged with distributing its profits to the 
community, proves that the community is both supportive and participating in the mining 
project, and that the community will receive significant material and financial benefit 
from the project.  However, all of the community respondents not directly involved with 
Xolco claim that they have no idea how Xolco was formed, and do not feel that it 
represents the community in any way.  The following sentiments expressed in a small 
group interview represent a typical response to the question, how was Xolco formed:  
Community Respondent Mfekethwa: Xolco was formed in the forest, the dark bush, to 
steal our land. No one knows how it was really formed. Xolco is like a wild animal, it was 
born and grew up in the forest. 
Community Respondent Mdumiseni: Nothing actually went well in the formation. 
According to traditional law, if you want to form anything that involves the land, you 
have to talk to the community and tribal authority at komkulu
20
 first, then get the people’s 




It appears that Xolco was at first formed by community member Zamile Qunya, 
employed by the MRC as the community liaison to communicate between the MRC and 
the community, and Maxwell Boqwana, a lawyer from East London.  After repeated 
complaints that Qunya had a conflict of interest, acting as both head of Xolco charged 
with pursuing mining as well as the head of Accoda Trust, a community trust charged 
with pursuing tourism, Qunya resigned and appointed a new board to head Xolco.
22
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 Small group interview with Nolulamo and Ward Counselor Mteki, 24/03/11. Mteki quoted.  
19
 Small group interview with Joli, Ndovela, and Hlongwe, 24/02/11.  
20
 Komkulu, or ‘great place’, refers to the traditional authority meeting place for all of Xolobeni.  
21
 Small group interview with S. Dlamini, Mfekethwa, and Mdumiseni, 20/02/11. 
22
 Information gathered from interviews with social worker John Clarke, former Xolco board member Pitso 
Msebane, and Nonhle Mbuthuma who was present at the meeting where Qunya resigned.  
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However, former Xolco board member Pitso Msebane claims that Xolco was still under 
Qunya’s control even after he resigned, as all communication between Xolco and 
MRC/TEM went through Qunya.
23
 Msebane went on to state that several of the worried 
board members brought in an independent lawyer to analyze the agreement Xolco had 
with MRC/TEM.  The lawyer told the 3 board members (2 of whom have since resigned 
and denounced Xolco) that: 
1) Xolco actually was forced to take out a large loan to pay for its 26 percent stake in 
TEM and that the amount paid was actually 80 percent of the value of TEM at the time,  
2) MRC/TEM had no obligation to stay with Xolco as its BEE partner and could 
potentially switch to another BEE once the mining right had been granted, 
 3) MRC/TEM would have the ability to sell the mining right to an entirely different 
company if the mining right were approved, a company which would have no obligation 
to partner with Xolco,  
4) The smelter would be built in East London and not provide jobs to the Xolobeni 
community, and  
5) There was no legal framework in place determining how the Xolco funds would be 
used, leaving the potential for massive corruption by the board.
24
 
In order to mount a more organized fight against the mine, the community decided 
to form the AmaDiba Crisis Committee (ACC), a semi-permanent group of community 
activists charged with managing the community’s anti-mining efforts.  In a stark contrast 
to Xolco, nearly all community respondents identified that the ACC was formed in the 
proper manner at a meeting at the tribal authority komkulu in 2004, where the community 
elected the board members.  Since its formation, the ACC has been in charge of updating 
the community on all developments regarding the mining project (usually at the weekly 
community meetings at komkulu), organizing protests such as the demonstration at the 
announcement of the approval of the mining right, and working with the Legal Resource 
Center (LRC) to lodge a formal appeal of the mining right.   
The ACC has aligned itself with the Saving the Wild Coast organization (SWC) 
and the LRC for logistical support, legal support, and public relations support.  The SWC 
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runs a website opposing the mining project, works with many journalists who report on 
the controversy, and helps pay some of the community’s legal costs.
25
  The LRC does 
most of the legal work involved in opposing the mine free of charge, and lodged the 
official appeal against the mining right on the community’s behalf.  The strategies of the 
ACC, as well as the role played by its allies outside the community (SWC and LRC), will 
be examined in detail in Chapter 4.  
 The role of the traditional tribal authority in the mining controversy had varied 
greatly, and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four.  During the early stages of 
the process, several headmen and sub-headmen gave their approval for the mining of the 
land, in many instances where they did not have the authority to do so.  However, King 
Sigcau, ruler of the Mpondo area that includes Xolobeni, has consistently opposed the 
mining project since becoming aware of the issue at an imbizo
26
 in 2004, as has Chief 
Lunga Baleni who rules over the entire AmaDiba area.  Perhaps non-coincidentally, both 
King Sigcau and Chief Baleni are facing court challenges over the legitimacy of their 
rule.   
 In summary, the major actors involved are as follows: 
-Opposing the mining project 
-The Xolobeni Community 
  -The AmaDiba Crisis Committee 
 -The Legal Resource Center (LRC)  
 -Saving the Wild Coast (SWC)  
-Supporting the mining project 
-The Xolobeni Empowerment Company 
-MRC/TEM 
-The South African Government 
  -The local Mbizana municipality 
-The national government, represented by the Department of Mineral 
Affairs and the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism.  
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 Interview with SWC director John Clarke, 14/03/11.  
26
 Imbizo refers to a public meeting in which the King or Paramount Chief listens to the people’s 
grievances directly. All community members are allowed to direct their questions and comments to the 
King at an imbizo. 
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 To comment on the participatory character of a mining project seems unnatural.  
Mining, by its very nature, appears to be a top-down, technocratic process with little 
room for popular participation outside the mine-workers themselves.  Such a viewpoint, 
however, assumes that everyone has the right to mine resources, assuming they find the 
minerals and have the capability to extract them, ignoring the fact that there are usually 
people living on the land that is to be mined.   
 In the case of Xolobeni, the Mpondo people have been living in the area for 
hundreds of years.  Use of the land for farming and grazing is a critical part of the 
Mpondo’s livelihood system.  If a mining company wishes to come mine the land, the 
proper way to do so that is fair to the Mpondo people is to work with them to construct a 
mining strategy that brings the community the most benefits possible while disturbing 
their already existing livelihood systems in the smallest way possible.  The greater the 
influence those who stand to be displaced or otherwise directly affected have over the 
final decision, the more likely it will be that the development plan properly 
accommodates their needs.  
 Instead, MRC/TEM came to the community with false information, tricks, and 
bribery in attempt to gain their acceptance.  Nearly all community respondents indicated 
that no real participation took place in the planning stages.  MRC/TEM contracted a 
consulting firm, Mazizi Msuthu Association, to explain to the community what mining 
would do to their community and to ensure that the local people consented to the mine’s 
initiation.  Numerous community respondents claimed that all the consultation workshops 
that Mazizi put on were held far inland, outside of the areas that would be directly 
affected by the mine.  During the consultations, community members were told that a 
decision had already been made to go ahead with the mining, and that the consultations 
were held to explain to the people what will happen.  Yet even at this level the mining 
company was dishonest, telling the community that there would be no relocations as a 
result of the mining while at the same time admitting to local government officials that 
relocations would take place.
27
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 Information obtained by comparing interviews with community members to interviews with Ward 
Councilors. The Ward Councilors all responded that there would be relocations.  Community members 
suspected there would be relocations but claimed they had been told no relocations would take place.  
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 Several community respondents had either been targets of bribery themselves or 
provided anecdotal evidence of the bribery of others.  One community respondent 
obtained a job with Mazizi Consulting with the responsibility of informing local residents 
about the time and location of the consultation workshops.  Afterward, the community 
liaison for the mining company told him that he should be paid double what they 
originally promised in exchange for his loyalty.
28
   
 In a separate incident, the community liaison took two minibus taxis full of local 
residents to Richards Bay in order to demonstrate the benefits the mine would supposedly 
bring.  According to residents who had been on the trip, participants were bribed with 
expensive accommodation, alcohol, food and clothing, and some were even given cash to 
pressure them into supporting the mine.
29
 At the scheduled report-back to the community, 
participants were told to remain silent and let the community liaison explain to the 
community what they saw.  One participant, Scorpion Dimane, stood up and publicly 
returned the clothing and money he was given on the trip, saying that he would not sell 




 Throughout the process, MRC/TEM has enjoyed strong support from the local 
Mbizana Municipality.  Officials from the Municipality have even attempted to use 
service delivery as a bargaining chip, claiming that no roads, water, or electricity will be 
delivered to Xolobeni if they refuse to accept the mining project (see Chapter 1 
Background).  All three Ward Councilors representing the community supported the 
mining throughout the consultation process despite the fact that the government created 
the position of Ward Councilor in order to elicit a greater degree of public participation in 
government.   
 The enormous degree of support from the local government can be attributed to a 
number of factors: a desire to have a large, highly publicized development project in their 
municipality, anticipation of increased funding in order to build roads and other 
infrastructure to service the mine, anticipation of increased revenue due to taxes 
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 Interview with Mzamo Dlamini, 19/02/11. 
29
 Small Group Interview with Community Respondents D, E, and F, 20/02/11. 
30
 Information obtained from numerous community interviews. All community respondents who spoke of 
Scorpion Dimane believed he was poisoned, but no forensic evidence has been obtained.  
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generated from the mine, and the creation of a significant number of jobs (even if they 
are not likely to employ local people).  As with development professionals, government 
officials do not gain notoriety and advancement by turning down big projects, even if 
those projects are likely to worsen the situation of the poor and are strongly opposed by 
local people.  In reality, careers advance through the creation of big projects, often 
regardless of their success (Ferguson 1990).  
 Applying the mining project to Pretty’s (1995) typology, the level of participation 
is clearly at the lowest level, manipulative participation.  Xolco, not truly representative 
of the community in the first place, has no power to influence decisions.  Participation 
was merely used by MRC/TEM as pretence to help convince the government to grant the 
mining license.  Their motivation likely lies in control and certainty; if an honest 
participatory approach were taken, the outcome would not be in the hands of the mining 
company but in the hands of local residents instead.  So in order to maintain control of 
the outcome, MRC/TEM attempted to coerce the community into acceptance through 
bribery, intimidation, manipulation, and misinformation.   
 
3.6 The Nature of South Africa’s Development Strategy 
 If one were to base an analysis of South Africa’s development strategy on the 
aforementioned development interventions in Xolobeni, the evident conclusion is that 
South Africa has changed from a top-down, state-led development strategy that existed 
under apartheid to a top-down, private sector-led development strategy with the state 
actually promoting initiatives and often empowering private sector actors.
31
  The role of 
the South African state, based on this analysis, has shifted from creating and 
implementing development interventions to the role of attracting and supporting neo-
liberal, private sector development interventions.  The development interventions still 
have involved a top-down method that fails to challenge normal power relations or 
empower poor people, but now private capital leads the way with strong backing from the 
state.  
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 This is not to say that one should base an analysis of South Africa’s development strategy simply on the 
development interventions in Xolobeni.  What I go on to say, however, is that the government’s 
development strategy toward Xolobeni seems to be a microcosm of its development strategy as a whole 
(based on the macro-level evidence).  
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 Scholars who have examined post-apartheid South Africa have found a similar 
trajectory in the state’s development strategy toward the entire country (Adelzadeh 1996; 
Bond 2001; Gelb 2004; Peet 2002).  In the post-Word War II period under apartheid, the 
South African state employed an interventionist economic policy.  The country’s most 
strategically important corporations, aside from several mining companies, were owned 
by the state.  Examples of state corporations include Alexkor (diamond mining), Sasol 
(energy), Iscor (steel), SAH&R (Harbours and railways), and Eskom (electricity).  The 
state used these corporations to heavily support the mining industry with direct and 
indirect subsidies, such as heavily subsidized electricity.  What emerged was a Minerals-
Energy Complex (MEC) that dominated the economy and crowded out manufacturing 
(Fine and Rustomjee 1996).  Development was thus led by an alliance of an Afrikaner 
state and English (mostly mining) capital (Ibid: 148).  The state aimed to provide full 
employment for the white minority through a combination of government jobs, including 
at state-owned corporations, and mining and manufacturing.  The non-white population 
was meant to both provide cheap labour for the mining industry and be self-sufficient 
through small-scale agriculture (Wolpe 1972).  The state attempted to assist in the 
development of black agriculture through the Betterment Scheme (see section 3.2) and 
similar state-led interventionist programmes.  
 After apartheid ended, many analysts expected the new democratic government to 
employ a socialist-style development strategy, as outlined in the Freedom Charter, which 
continued to utilize interventionist policies aimed at providing full employment and well-
being for the whole country rather than only the white population.  Nelson Mandela had 
stated as late as 1990 that the ANC would nationalize “the mines, banks, and 
monopolies” (Peet 2002: 76).  The first indication of the post-apartheid state’s 
development strategy came in the form of the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) in 1994.  The RDP document indicated that the new government 
would use an “industrial strategy [that] involved increasing national investment, 
especially in manufacturing, job creating, and the meeting of basic needs” (Ibid: 75).  
While the RDP did not provide for nationalization, it did state that the government 
planned to achieve growth through redistribution (Ibid: 59).   
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 After only two years, the South African government’s development strategy (and 
economic policy as a whole) took a major shift to the right, as indicated by the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) plan (1996).  As opposed to the RDP, GEAR 
advocated redistribution through growth rather than growth through redistribution (Ibid).  
Not only was nationalization no longer on the table, GEAR called for the privatization of 
certain state corporations.  GEAR further planned for deregulation, trade liberalization, 
cutting state expenditure, and creating a more flexible labour market “widely interpreted 
as a euphemism for the suppression of unions” (Peet 2002: 80).  Thus, while the flexible 
labour market approach was never actually employed (as unions continue to wield large 
amounts of power), the development strategy outlined in GEAR was essentially in line 
with the neo-liberal policy prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank. 
 The main goal of any neo-liberal development strategy, GEAR included, is to 
create a stable economic situation that avoids inflation and generates sustained private 
sector-led economic growth through trade and international investment.  The South 
African government declined to employ an interventionist industrial policy in deference 
to natural market forces.  Thus, the South African state’s development strategy post-
apartheid has been private sector-led backed by state support via deregulation and trade 
liberalization.  It is in this context that the South African government supported Sappi’s 
Gum Tree Development (section 3.3), the EU Programme’s tourism development 
(section 3.4), and MRC/TEM’s mining project (section 3.5 and Chapter 1 Background).   
 The MEC that was created under apartheid is still present, albeit moderately 
smaller and with slightly less influence over the economy (Fine 2010: 28).  Yet a large 
amount of influence endures.  As recently as 1990, the MEC accounted for 25 percent of 
South Africa’s GDP (Fine and Rustomjee 1996: 81).  The continued influence of the 
MEC is evidenced by the fact that mining companies continue to enjoy heavily 
subsidized electricity.  Therefore, it is certainly possible that the large amount of power 
and influence wielded by the MEC puts pressure on the Department of Mineral Affairs 
and other government structures to support and approve almost all mining projects, as 
evidenced by the Department’s failure to deny licenses in all but the most high profile 
cases (St. Lucia, Xolobeni).  In the case of Xolobeni, the government initially approved 
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MRC/TEM’s mining right application despite allegations of human rights violations, 
enormous bad publicity, intense and overt opposition by many Xolobeni residents, 
evidence of manipulation by MRC/TEM, and the unrepresentative nature and high 
potential for corruption in Xolco.  While the government eventually revoked the license 
in June 2011 (before any operations had begun), they have not ruled out re-approving the 
license in the future.  
 In the context of South Africa’s neo-liberal development strategy, what level of 
participatory development is really possible, or most likely to occur?  Development 
interventions led by the private sector have very little reason to encourage participation as 
anything other than a means for greater efficiency, or in a strategy of dominance through 
inclusion.  The overriding priority of any private sector development is to make profit, 
not to eradicate poverty or empower the poor.  Sappi and MRC/TEM are not charities 
charged with developing Xolobeni; they are private companies attempting to exploit the 
resources of the area in order to make a profit.  Private companies will only employ 
interactive participation if they are forced to do so.  However, the creation of additional 
regulation that requires interactive participation in private sector operations that involve 
direct contact with South Africans is unlikely given the neo-liberal orientation of the 



























Chapter 4: Xolobeni’s Strategies of Resistance 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 Chapter 4 begins with an examination of the main reasons for the strong 
resistance of many Xolobeni residents to the mining project.  The sources of opposition 
include a desire to protect the land and water resources that are an essential part of most 
local residents’ livelihood systems, anger over the way in which the consultation process 
was conducted, objections to the character of Xolco and the way in which it was formed, 
and previous negative experiences with top-down style development projects (discussed 
in Chapter 3). 
 Next, the chapter examines and analyzes the wide array of resistance strategies 
local residents have used to oppose the mining project.  The strategies outlined include: 
various forms of popular protest both violent and non-violent, appeals to the traditional 
tribal authority to stop the mine on the community’s behalf, the formation of the 
AmaDiba Crisis Committee (ACC) as a semi-permanent body of community activists to 
combat the mining project, the use of the Legal Resource Center (LRC) to lodge legal 
appeals, the creation of a community-based development project (Simbhademe) as a job-
creating alternative to the mining development, and active participation in the selection of 
local Ward Councilors in the May 2011 elections to ensure that all representatives are 
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anti-mining in an effort to change the behaviour of the local municipal government.  The 
success of the different resistance strategies and what they mean in terms of the political 
economy of development in South Africa is then analyzed, using the concept of invented 
and invited spaces of citizenship as an analytical framework.   
  
4.2 Reasons for Opposition 
 The people of Xolobeni have many reasons to oppose the MRC/TEM mining 
project.  The reason most often cited in the community interviews conducted for this 
report was protection of the land due to its integral part in people’s livelihood systems.  
Very few people in AmaDiba have a job that earns a wage or salary; only about half of 
the population fits in the economically active category (ages 15-65), and among them the 
unemployment rate is an astonishing 71.5 percent (SARPN 2008).  Nearly all AmaDiba 
households also receive a government grant in the form of an old age pension, child 
support grant or disability grant (Ibid).  The cash generated is used mainly to pay school 
fees, purchase clothing, buy alcohol or other luxuries, and to purchase essentials that are 
not locally grown, such as cooking oil and salt (Bennie 2010: 56).   
 Alongside the modest cash income most families receive in the form of grants and 
in some cases wage labour, nearly all households in AmaDiba provide for their remaining 
needs by making use of the land.  Local residents estimated that at least 60 percent of 
their food intake comes from subsistence agriculture, an assertion supported by Andrew 
Bennie’s research into local people’s livelihood systems (2010: 54-66).  Thus, while the 
use of subsistence agriculture has steady declined in most parts of rural South Africa in 
the past century, it has declined to a much lesser extent in AmaDiba.   
In addition to subsistence agriculture, local people use the land to provide for their 
own needs in several ways.  Coastal residents have the benefit of fishing and collecting 
shellfish from the ocean and beach.  Almost all homesteads in AmaDiba are traditional 
rondavels, built using mud-bricks for the walls, dung for the floor, and wood and straw 
for the roof, materials all gathered locally at no cost.  In lieu of any piped water service, 
residents gather all their drinking, cooking, and washing water from local streams and 
rivers, also at no cost (other than the hours of labour time spent fetching water each day).   
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Thus, when asked why they oppose the mining project, nearly all those 
interviewed offered responses indicating that they are afraid the project will hinder their 
ability to make a living off the land.  The following statements are typical of local 
residents’ view of the situation: 
Mfekethwa: It [mining] would mean hunger, because we grow our food on this land, and 
our livestock as well. As we said we have no formal jobs so taking away our ability to 
produce food from the land will mean we will die very soon.  
S Dlamini: You should think about even the water that we use for drinking and fishing 
comes from the land and the mine would spoil it as it has in other areas. No food and no 
water…they talk about how beautiful this area is and they want to take that away from us 




Media portrayals of mining has undoubtedly played a part in shaping people’s 
perceptions; numerous respondents mentioned seeing television shows and news articles 
about the way mining activity has polluted the land and water elsewhere.  The extent to 
which the mining project would disrupt farming, cattle-stocking, and the use of clean 
local water is a contentious issue; those in support of the mine claim the project would 
make only a slight disruption, while those in opposition claim it will make the land and 
water unusable, and both sides have used ‘scientific’ studies to support their claims.  
What is clear is that some disruption of local people’s use of the community’s natural 
resources would occur, and that the local people see this as a major threat to their 
livelihood systems.   
Additionally, few respondents held out much hope for gaining employment from 
the mine, recognizing that people would migrate to Xolobeni from all around South 
Africa, many with better qualifications than local residents.  This view is supported by 
fact, as most mining companies now require a grade 12 education, which less than 1 
percent of Mbizana has achieved (Bennie 2010: 54).  Furthermore, if a smelter was built 
it would be constructed in East London, outside of the Xolobeni area (MRC Annual 
Report 2009).  
 In addition to their objections over how the mining will affect the land, local 
people also trace their opposition to objections over the way in which the project was 
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 Small group interview with S Dlamini, Mfekethwa, and Mdumiseni, 20/02/11. 
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brought to the community.  Most respondents seemed to have an ingrained sense that the 
land and resources of Xolobeni belonged collectively to the local people, and that the 
proper approach for an outsider wishing to make use of the resources is to ask permission 
at a pre-existing community structure, such as the weekly tribal authority meetings at 
komkulu.  For example, when asked what the best development strategy for Xolobeni 
would be, one respondent advocated anything that would bring formal employment, but 
only if it was brought the right way: 
The best development strategy would be to bring anything that would employ people, 
such as a factory. But the owner must come to the community first and ask permission 
and make an agreement. They must not just build.
33
 
Rather than coming to the community to ask permission, MRC/TEM tried to force local 
people’s acceptance of the mining project through bribery, manipulation, misinformation 
and trickery, often telling people that the decision to mine had already been made.   
 An additional cause of the community’s opposition to the mining project lies in 
the character of Xolco.  As previously discussed, most local people are offended by the 
claim that Xolco represents the community.  No community members knew how Xolco 
was formed, and assumed that any profit Xolco made would not be reinvested into the 
community but rather that the leadership of Xolco would pocket the money.  In summary, 
the underpinnings of the massive community opposition to the mining project are a fear 
of the pollution of the land and the destruction of their livelihood system, skepticism that 
the mine will employ local people, aversion to the way the project has been forced upon 
them, and widespread disbelief that Xolco’s profits will be used to benefit the 
community.   
 Finally, the community’s negative experiences with past top-down development 
projects likely played a role in the people’s rejection of the mining project.  All the major 
development interventions previously brought to the community ended in conflict and 
destruction, with the tourism development as a partial exception (see Chapter 3).  That 
these historical interventions still affect people’s view of development projects today is 
evidenced by the fact that numerous community respondents brought up the Mpondo 
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 Small group interview with Matom and Masoya Dlamini, 20/02/11. Matom quoted. 
 64 
Revolt as a comparative example to the mining project, claiming that both involved an 
attempt to steal their land, without any prompting from the interviewer.   
 
4.3 Strategies of Resistance 
 Throughout the consultation process and beyond, people from the Xolobeni area 
used a variety of techniques to resist the mining project.  An examination of their 
techniques is presented here in an effort to better understand the different power-relations 
that came into play that led to the initial granting of the mining license, followed by its 
suspension and eventual revocation upon appeal.  
 The first strategy used by the community was an attempt to disrupt the 
consultations with tough questions that would reveal the ugly side of mining.  As 
discussed earlier, the consultation meetings were seen by the residents not as an open 
process where concerns were addressed and permission was requested, but instead as 
workshops in which people were told about all the benefits mining would bring them.  
Afraid that these consultations would lead people to support the mine in anticipation of 
such benefits, several community activists began in 2006 to meet with community 
members before the consultations, advising them to ask targeted questions.  The 
questions mainly centered on potential relocations of homes and graves, pollution of the 
land and water, uncertainty about Xolco and how it was formed, and doubt as to whether 
community members would really receive jobs.  As a result of the questioning, further 
uncertainty, doubt, and opposition were imbedded in those who attended the 
consultations.  Several community respondents complained that those running the 
consultations would delay responding to such questions, promising to return with answers 
on a future date that never came: 





Such unanswered questions undoubtedly undermined the credibility of the Mazizi 
Consulting Firm that ran the consultations.   
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 Small Group Interview with Mike Joli and Jelselma Joli, 29/03/11. Mike Joli quoted. 
 65 
 A second resistance strategy used by local people was various forms of public 
protest, both violent and non-violent.  In terms of non-violent protest, an anti-mining 
march was organized in July 2008 by community activists and Saving the Wild Coast 
(SWC) in which local residents and others opposed to the mining such as 
environmentalists walked the entire length of the proposed mining site while brandishing 
signs and yelling anti-mining chants.  The popular television program Carte Blanche was 
invited to the area and aired two separate episodes that voiced the community’s 
opposition to the project (Carte Blanche 2008).  Numerous newspapers and news 
magazines, including The Mercury, Noseweek, and The Sunday Tribune, published stories 
about the local opposition.  Finally, a large demonstration was made at the announcement 
of the approval of the mining right in 2008, leading to the disruption of the event (see 
Chapter 1 Background).  All of these demonstrations served to put public pressure on the 
government to deny the mining right due to the bad publicity generated, while at the same 
time alerting potential allies of the fight.  
 In terms of violent protest, there are three separate incidents of note.  The first 
was the vandalism of MRC/TEM monitoring devices set up in and around the mining site 
to measure dust.  Several young people in the community were arrested for destroying the 
devices in 2002 in their attempt to derail the mining company’s efforts.
35
  The second 
incident took place immediately after the announcement that the government would grant 
the mining right in 2008.  The main headman for all of AmaDiba, who had been against 
the mining in the past but switched to supporting the mine in 2008, was beaten nearly to 
death by a group of community members on his way home from the event.
36
  The 
headman and his family then moved away, and the headman died from an unrelated 
illness soon after, leaving no acting headman for Amadiba.  The third form of violent 
protest employed by local people comes not in the form of action but in repeated verbal 
threats of violence, often with references to the Mpondo Revolt.  A typical example 
follows from Community Respondent C: 
To oppose Betterment, we had to fight, sleeping the forest, it can happen again if it needs 
to. This is going to take us back to that time, a bad situation where we had to kill the 
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 Interview with Nonhle Mbuthuma, 19/02/11. 
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 Numerous community members recounted this event in interviews.  
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people who were in favour of it. If the mining comes, all the people in support will be on 




Threats of violence were not limited to private interviews, but were proclaimed publicly 
on the television Carte Blanche and in interviews with reporters.  The threats and acts of 
violence served to put further pressure on the government to reject the mining application 
in fear of the further conflict and violence it would cause.  
 A third strategy of resistance employed by the community was to organize their 
resistance through the formation of the AmaDiba Crisis Committee (ACC) in 2002.  The 
ACC leadership was elected at one of the weekly community gatherings under the tribal 
authority at komkulu, which is physically located in the Kwanyana block where the 
mining right was granted in 2008.  The task of the ACC was to organize and manage the 
community’s resistance.  The head of the organization is Bazooka Radebe, a local taxi 
owner and former member of Xolco who left once he became aware of the organization’s 
corrupt and undemocratic nature.
38
  Since its formation in 2002, the board of the ACC 
has continually informed the community of the state of the mining project both through 
personal conversations and at the weekly meetings at komkulu.  The ACC organized the 
protest at the announcement that the mining right had been granted, alerting the local 
people who were unaware that such an announcement was to be made.
39
 Furthermore, all 
of the strategies and actions listed below were either planned, implemented, or assisted 
by the ACC, making it an extremely important actor in the mining saga.  
 One strategy used by the community and the ACC was to appeal to the traditional 
authority structures representing the area.  The highest level of traditional authority 
presiding over Xolobeni is King Sicgau, paramount chief of all of Mpondoland.  After 
hearing from the ACC, King Sicgau called for an imbizo
40
 in order to hear directly from 
the community what the issue was.  After the imbizo, King Sicgau made strong public 
denouncements of the mining project, claiming it did not have his support or the support 
of his people.  King Sicgau’s right to the throne is now being challenged by the 
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 Interview with Community Respondent C, 21/02/11.  
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 Interviews with Community Respondents A and B, 19/02/11.  
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 Interview with Nonhle Mbuthuma, 19/02/11.  
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 An imbizo is a large public gathering, under the traditional authority, in which the King or Chief hears 




  Chief Lunga Baleni is the second highest traditional authority figure 
presiding over Xolobeni, claiming authority over all of AmaDiba.  Chief Baleni has 
consistently opposed the mining project, and since meeting with the ACC, Chief Baleni 
has publicly claimed that the mine does not have the support of him or his people.  Under 
Chief Baleni is headman Ndabazakhe Baleni, claiming authority over only coastal 
AmaDiba, who at first opposed the mine at the ACC’s urging, then switched to 
supporting the mine just before the mining right was granted in 2008.  Headman 
Ndabazakhe was the victim of the community’s violent attack after the mining right 
event, and no new headman has been named since.  Thus, the ACC managed to convince 
all the most powerful and public members of the traditional authority to publicly oppose 
the mine, striking a serious blow to MRC/TEM’s and the municipal government’s claim 
of widespread community support. 
 In addition to their appeals to the traditional authority, the ACC also made a 
formal complaint to the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), with the 
help of activist social worker John Clarke.  Clarke submitted the complaint on the behalf 
of the ACC in 2007, which claimed that the underhanded nature of the consultation 
process violated the local people’s human rights.  In the complaint, Clarke and the ACC 
identified seven human rights that had been violated: the right to human dignity, the right 
of freedom of expression, the right of assembly, freedom of trade, occupation and 
profession, the right to an environment that is not harmful to people’s health, the right to 
property, and the right of access to information.  The SAHRC held a highly publicized 
hearing in 2008, and their findings mainly confirmed the alleged human rights abuses, 
and stressed that there had been insufficient consultation with the community (Bennie 
2010: 145).   
 For legal assistance, the ACC enlisted the supported of the East London based 
Legal Resource Center (LRC).  The LRC began to work with the ACC in 2008 after the 
decision to grant the mining license was announced.  The LRC then submitted a formal 
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 King Sicgau is the descendant of Paramount Chief Both Sicgau, a major collaborator with the apartheid 
government and the Betterment Scheme.  During the mPondo Revolt, many mPondo’s claimed his brother 
had the true right to the throne.  In an ironic twist, the current King Sicgau, grandson of Botha Sicgau, is 
now opposing the government’s plans.  Perhaps non-coincidentally, the government is now claiming that 
Botha Sicgau’s brother was the true heir to the throne over 70 years ago, and is in the process of 
challenging the current King’s legitimacy to rule in court.  
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appeal of the decision to the then Department of Minerals and Energy in 2008, detailing 
the insufficient and fraudulent consultation process and requesting that the license be 
revoked.
42
 The LRC also began to prepare documents and evidence for court challenges 
of the mining right in the case that the Minister did not revoke the license upon appeal.  
Furthermore, the LRC repeatedly pressured the now Department of Mineral Affairs to 
make a decision on the appeal after several deadlines had passed, with the decision to 
revoke the license finally coming in June of 2011.  The assistance of the LRC was thus 
vital to the community’s resistance to the mine, most notably due to the success of the 
appeal which the LRC authored and submitted at no cost to the community. 
 Another tactic used by the ACC to oppose the mining project was the creation of 
their own job-creating development project labeled Simbhademe
43
.  The purpose of 
Simbhademe was to demonstrate to the community that there were other ways to create 
jobs other than the mining project, which had employed numerous community members 
in roles such as dust collection, installations, sample collectors, community liaisons, and 
promoters for the consultations.
44
 The project was initiated, planned, designed, and 
implemented by the ACC and other community members, and thus it can be said to have 
the highest level of participation, self-mobilization (see section 2.3.2).  The funding for 
the project came from several different sources: the Community Organization Resource 
Center (CORC), PondoCROP, the South African Faith Communities Environmental 
Initiative (SAFCEI), and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), with CORC and 
PondoCROP also contributing logistical and managerial support.  The project involved 
all five coastal AmaDiba villages as well as one inland village along the Mtentu River.   
The project was broken into three phases, each lasting approximately six months.  
The first phase involved separate workshops in each of the six villages to determine what 
kind of small-scale development projects people wanted, with specialists on hand to 
answer technical questions.  The second phase involved a smaller group from each of the 
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 Amadiba Crisis Committee’s Internal Appeal to the Minister of Minerals and Energy Against the Award 
of a Mining Right to Transworld Energy and Mineral Resources (SA) (PTY) LTD, September 2008  
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 English translation: We have discovered. 
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 All information about Simbhademe gathered through the following: Interview with Mzamo Dlamini, 
19/02/11. Interview with Nonhle Mbuthuma, 19/02/11. Email correspondence with John Clarke, Mzamo 
Dlamini, and Nonhle Mbuthuma 01/05/11-30/06/11. 
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six villages who were selected to visit other areas to observe other development projects, 
as well as training specific to whatever project the village had decided upon.  The final 
phase involved the actual execution of the projects. The planning for the project began in 
2007, and all phases had been completed by 2009.   
The projects differed for each of the six villages, and involved approximately five 
people from each village in the implementation.  Some villages simply wanted to register 
development committees for their locale in order to put the legal framework in place and 
attract investment for future projects.  Examples of some of the other small-scale projects 
include the attainment of a local grinding mill which is used to grind dry maize for 
making mealie meal, pap and porridge (which villagers would normally have to travel a 
long distance to use), and a project in which large chickens bred for meat were bought in 
bulk at a large farm and then sold to community members with the profit being used to 
improve the school building.   
The projects, while small-scale and short-term, were well-suited to improve 
people’s lives without disturbing their livelihood systems.  Simbhademe was an 
important tactic in the opposition to the mine as it demonstrated that alternative 
development and alternatives to the mining project were still possible.  In addition, the 
programme offers exciting possibilities for future development projects in the area as it 
has shown a clear determination and capability for self-mobilization style development.  
The final strategy employed by the ACC to oppose the mining project was a 
concentrated effort to change the behavior of the Mbizana Municipality through the May 
2011 elections.  Working with the ANC, most notably local ANC branch chairperson 
Pitso Msebane, the ACC ensured that all three ANC candidates for Ward Councilor 
representing coastal Amadiba were anti-mining.  Via the May 2011 elections, the ACC 
was thus able to replace the three Ward Councilors representing the area that had pushed 
hard for mining with Councilors who have promised to listen to the people and oppose 
the mining project.  Numerous ACC members and other community respondents 
interviewed indicated a strong hope that this would lead to an increase in the attention 
and responsiveness by the Municipality to the people’s opinions.   
 
4.4 Analysis of Opposition 
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 One useful way to examine the different resistance strategies used by the 
Xolobeni people is through Miraftab’s (2006) concepts of invited and invented spaces of 
citizenship.  In Miraftab’s construct, invited spaces are grassroots actions that legitimized 
by donors and government interventions (i.e. legitimized from the top down), while 
invented spaces are “collective actions by the poor that directly confront the authorities 
and challenge the status quo” (2006: 195).  The main difference between the two spaces 
is that invited spaces are set up and defined by the state, while invented spaces are 
created by citizens themselves and lie outside what the state considers acceptable citizen 
participation (Ibid).  Furthermore, invited spaces attempt to cope with existing systems of 
hardship, while invented spaces attempt to change them (Ibid).  The author goes on to 
highlight that the two spaces are “in a mutually constituted, interacting relationship, not a 
binary one” (Ibid).   
 Looking at the actions of the people of Xolobeni through Miraftab’s framework, it 
becomes evident that most of the actions came through invited spaces of citizenship.  
Arriving at the consultations with tough questions and organizing a peaceful protest 
march along the coast were both actions made acceptable from the top, mostly via the 
South African Constitution.  Appealing to independent newspapers and television shows, 
filing a complaint with the SAHRC, approaching the traditional authority for assistance, 
securing legal assistance from the LRC, and campaigning to affect the May 2011 local 
election are all actions that are clearly and firmly within invited spaces of citizenship.  
Taken together, this wide array of invited action indicates that the South African 
government has enormously widened the invited space for citizen participation since 
apartheid to a level not seen in most other nations still considered to be ‘developing’.   
 The formation of the ACC and the creation of Simbhademe can both be said to be 
partially situated in invited spaces of citizenship, but are partly invented spaces as well.  
Both are not outlawed or illegal, yet both work outside the normalized system of power-
relations.  The ACC can be described as an community organization, constituted entirely 
outside of state control, that acts to protect the community’s interest above all else, 
including when in conflict with the interest of the state.  The ACC can be contrasted with 
the Mbizana Municipality which is meant to act on behalf of the local community’s 
interest, yet is at the same time accountable to the central state as it is in fact an arm of 
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the state.  While they are both meant to represent the community, the ACC was created 
from the bottom, while the Municipality was created from the top.   
 The Simbhademe programme also serves to challenge the normalized system of 
power-relations.  While the state does allow these types of autonomous development 
programmes, it is in the state’s interest to maintain control over such projects through the 
involvement of government institutions and structures.  Simbhademe only interacted with 
the state insofar as it did not conflict with any laws or regulations.  The ACC and 
Simbhademe thus confront normalized power-relations by going outside systemic 
interactions and creating a new space in which to evoke citizen-power.  Neither are 
purely autonomous from existing structures; the ACC was elected within the traditional 
authority structures which sit adjacent to the state, and have relied on help from a state 
social worker (John Clarke) and an existing NGO (the LRC), while Simbhademe also 
developed within traditional authority structures and relied on aid from NGOs (CORC, 
PondoCROP, SAFCEI) and an international development organization (UNDP).  Yet 
both the ACC and Simbhademe worked with non-state (NGOs) or extra-state (the 
traditional authority) structures to oppose what the state and a capital-heavy corporation 
were pushing for.   
One resistance strategy has yet to be dealt with: the use of violent protest to 
oppose the mining project, both in terms of actions and threats.  Violent protest action is 
certainly not an invited space of action, and is universally denigrated by the state as 
criminal.  I have included in this category the protest that disrupted the celebration the 
government had set up to announce the approval of the mining right.  The protest was not 
sanctioned by the government, and according to several community respondents who 




 While not central to the community’s resistance, violent protest and threats of 
further violence did play a role.  The protest at the approval announcement was, 
according to former Minister Sonjica, the immediate cause for the Department of 
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 Three separate community respondents claimed, the first without prompting and the two others after 
questioning, that the police (who by all accounts numbered in the hundreds) were ordered to break up the 
protest, but refused when the chief on-hand was explained the situation by protesting residents.  Regardless 
of the accuracy of this story, the protest was unsanctioned, ended in the violent beating of a headman, and 
disrupted a state event.  
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Minerals and Energy’s suspension of the mining right.  In addition, threats of apartheid-
era revolt from residents in newspaper articles and television shows may have caused 
government officials to fear what violence may indeed occur if the mining project was 
initiated.   
 From the community’s perspective, violence seemed to be the tactic of last resort 
if all other tactics failed.  Looking at their strategy as a whole, the community began to 
oppose the mine by actively participating in the consultation process, an invited space of 
participation.  When the consultants ignored their concerns, the ACC was formed in order 
to stage a more organized, sustained and tactical resistance, an action that walked the line 
between invited and invented participation.  The ACC then approached the traditional 
authority for help, filed a complaint to the SAHRC via John Clarke, worked with the 
LRC to formally appeal the decision, and worked with the ANC and campaigned to 
ensure all those directly representing them opposed the mine, all actions that fall within 
invited spaces of participation.  At the same time, the community initiated Simbhademe 
and engaged in limited violent protest, actions that edge further toward invented spaces of 
participation.  According to community respondents and ACC leadership, had the appeal 
not led to the revocation of the mining license, the next step would have been to 
challenge the mining right in court, another purely invited space of citizen participation.  
However, community respondents claimed again and again that the final resistance tactic 
would have been larger-scale violence and even all-out revolt.   
 The fact that there were so many resistance tactics available to the community in 
invited or semi-invited spaces of citizen participation is indicative of how far South 
Africa has come since the Betterment Scheme and Mpondo Revolt in 1960.  That South 
Africa’s political economy allows for a group of villages as capital-poor as coastal 
AmaDiba fight off a development intervention initiated by a capital-rich multinational 



















Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion 
  
The Xolobeni Mineral Sands Project and the fight over whether to grant 
Australia’s MRC mining company license to mine the sand along Eastern Pondoland 
brought up numerous important and controversial issues central to development in South 
Africa.  This paper has focused on the issue of participation in development, 
summarizing and critiquing debates over the role of popular participation in development 
projects.  The dissertation also scrutinizes what level of participation is possible in South 
Africa’s post-apartheid political and economic context, as well as how much participation 
is sought by the state through an examination of the state’s actions in the Xolobeni case, 
as well as the resistance strategies of the Xolobeni residents.  
 It is difficult to draw specific conclusions as to the exact goals of the South 
African state (regarding participation in development or any other issue), because as is 
common with all governments, the South African state is not a homogenous, unified 
entity but rather a constantly changing collection of distinct, diverse, competing 
individuals and interests.  One conclusion that can be drawn, however, is that the South 
African state allows a relatively large amount of space for popular participation in 
development projects.  The actions and resistance strategies of the Xolobeni residents 
opposing the mining project were not met with overt forms of state repression, violent or 
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otherwise.  Instead, the Xolobeni residents were allowed to voice their concerns through 
a variety of formats, albeit many of them had to be creatively invented by the people.  
The strategies used (public protest, appeals to sympathetic mass media, legal challenges) 
were not necessarily endorsed and certainly not encouraged by the state, but at the same 
time they were not very actively opposed, and certainly not violently repressed either.  
The fact that in the end the state listened to the local resistance and first suspended and 
then revoked the mining license voluntarily (without a court order forcing them to do so) 
is perhaps most revealing of the amount of local popular participation the state allowed, 
though not necessarily encouraged.  
 In terms of the Xolobeni residents themselves, their actions in opposing the 
mining project and even actively attempting to create their own development alternatives 
(as discussed in Chapter 4) indicates that the residents are currently attempting to initiate 
development at the highest level of Pretty’s typology of participation, self-mobilization.  
Ideally, all communities would be self-mobilizing, attempting to create their own 
development initiatives and attracting outside investment and support.  However, few 
poor communities in the developing world can be characterized in such a way due to a 
variety of factors including lack of education, resources, free time, networks and links to 
the relevant external agents, and even lack of hope and ambition due to the disheartening 
and seemingly inescapable cycle of poverty.  Given its uniqueness, how can the self-
mobilization of Xolobeni be explained? 
 Several factors likely came into play, all of which have been discussed either 
directly or indirectly in this paper.  One possible explanation is that the mobilization of 
Xolobeni arose out of its opposition to the mining project directly, and the unity and 
collective action that successfully opposing the project demanded.  The rationalization is 
based on Hajer’s (2003) argument that, in the context of a network society, “it is likely 
that it is the confrontation with a particular policy programme that first provides the 
shared basis for discussion, that first brings together the range of individuals in a 
particular region” (Hajer 2003: 95).  Faced with what they perceived to be a major threat 
to their livelihood strategies, the Xolobeni residents came together to oppose the mining 
project, and in the process discussed what they liked about their current situation, what 
they did not like, and how things could be improved.  The result was not only the creation 
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of the ACC and other action to oppose the mine, but also the creation of Simbhademe and 
a general consensus that tourism development should be actively attracted to the area.  
 A complimentary explanation is that the interference from outside activists 
seeking to protect the scenic beauty of the Wild Cost was a driving force behind the areas 
mobilization.  In fact, one could further claim that the presence of numerous print and 
television journalists and even researchers such as myself contributed to the  
mobilization of Xolobeni.  The questioning of residents by researchers and journalists 
doubtlessly caused people to think about development issues more actively and more 
often than under normal circumstances, and the contention by the media and 
environmental activists that the Wild Coast is a beautiful natural oasis likely affected 
local perceptions of their home environment, as well as what the best development 
strategy would be.   
 Another explanation is that the Xolobeni residents continue to be informed by 
their historical tradition of resistance, outlined in Chapter 3.  Not only was Eastern 
Pondoland the epicenter for resistance to the Betterment Scheme and the location of the 
Gum Tree Rebellion, the larger Eastern Cape Province also produced more than its fair 
share of anti-apartheid leaders, most notably Nelson Mandela.  Evidence that this history 
still affects the consciousness of the Xolobeni people was presented and examined in 
Chapter 3.  The area’s history of resistance seems to have contributed to the acquisition 
of a cavalier attitude that is embraced by the local people, and this attitude likely 
contributes to the people’s desire for self-determination in terms of local development. 
 Finally, the significant expansion of individual and indigenous rights since the 
end of apartheid doubtlessly played an important role.  In many other developing 
countries, the objections and resistance of the local (and directly affected) population 
likely would have been ignored or actively crushed by a central government aiming to 
generate revenue and increase exports.  As discussed in Chapter 4, the Xolobeni residents 
had numerous avenues open to them in their resistance to the mining project, and in the 
end, the government gave in to their demands.   
 In today’s global political and economic environment, an ever-consolidating and 
dwindling number of powerful supranational financial organizations and foreign 
government wield more and more economic and political power.  At the same time, these 
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organizations have become increasingly uniform in their policy prescriptions regarding 
development despite deepening inequality and stagnating poverty levels.  In this 
contemporary political and economic environment, concerns about who participates in 
development and how their opinions and desires are mediated and represented become 
increasingly important.  If the goal is to challenge the broad, hegemonic, and basically 
uniform policy prescriptions of the global elite with diverse, context-specific, creative 
and unique ideas grown from the bottom-up, it is necessary to pay close attention to what 
is actually occurring in spaces of participation, whether invited or invented, as well as 
what outcomes they produce.  In Xolobeni, the massive amount of both invited and 
invented forms participation by local people led to the defeat of the mining project.  The 
mine’s defeat was a victory for Xolobeni residents; whether it was a victory for the whole 
country is debatable, and is certainly an area that requires further research.  
Development in which experts arrive at a location to tell the people, “I know why 
you are poor, listen and do what I say and you will become wealthy like me,” is coming 
to an end.  Through participatory approaches, the situation is changing to one in which 
development professionals, still with a theoretical background, arrive at a location to ask 
the people questions such as why are you struggling, what are your limitations, 
capabilities, and opportunities, and how can your livelihood systems be improved?  
Development strategies can then be built together that confront both context-specific and 
macro-structural factors that cause powerlessness, poverty, isolation, exclusion, and 
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